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PATRICK REDMOND*

The Public Trust in Wildlife: Two
Steps Forward, Two Steps Back**
ABSTRACT
Many environmental advocates have recently lobbied for the application of the public trust doctrine to wildlife, among other natural resources, often pointing to the need for a new “ecosystemic” ethical
framework for resource management and decision-making. In many
states that have addressed this possibility, the road toward recognition of a “public trust in wildlife” has been a bumpy one, with halting encouragement provided by statutes or occasional court
statements often preceding or even masking a more complex doctrinal development away from the public trust’s more expansive application. This article traces this “two steps forward, two steps back”
trajectory in detail in six states—California, Idaho, Michigan, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and Washington—whose courts have grappled with or suggested extending the scope and the protected uses of
the public trust doctrine to support wildlife preservation efforts. It
concludes that, despite the growing urgency of biodiversity loss and
unacceptability of complacency, the public trust’s expansion has
been limited by powerful opposition, by its susceptibility to distinct
forms of judicial side-stepping, and by the erosion of judicial recognition of causes of action based on ecological preservation over the past
two decades.

* J.D. 2008, University of New Mexico School of Law. Lead Articles Editor, Natural
Resources Journal, 2007–08. The author currently practices in natural resources and
endangered species law in Albuquerque. He would like to thank former Editor-in-Chief G.
Emlen “Em” Hall for many stimulating conversations that enhanced this article’s
conclusions.
** Since this article was submitted for publication, two significant California
appellate decisions were released, which, appropriately for the theme of the article, point in
opposite directions. A California Court of Appeal, in Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL
Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), reviewed over a century of the state’s
case law and concluded, “it is clear that the public trust doctrine encompasses the
protection of undomesticated birds and wildlife.” Id. at 599. Two months earlier, the
California Supreme Court decided Cal. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. (EPIC) v. Cal. Dep’t of Forestry &
Fire Prot., 187 P.3d 888 (2008), on statutory grounds and seemed to confine the common law
public trust doctrine’s application to water resources; the court found an “overlap” where
the protection of wildlife is “intertwined” with the protection of water resources, but “the
duty of government agencies to protect wildlife is primarily statutory.” Id. at 926. The FPL
court clearly disagreed, but tactfully (and with questionable accuracy) observed that for the
purposes of that case, “it matters not whether the obligations imposed by the public trust
are considered to be derived from the common law or from statutory law, or from both.
Either way, public agencies must consider the protection and preservation of wildlife.”
FPL, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 599–600.

249

\\server05\productn\n\nmn\49-1\NMN107.txt

250

unknown

Seq: 2

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

9-MAR-10

15:29

[Vol. 49

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, numerous legal scholars and environmental advocates have lobbied for the recognition of a “public trust in
wildlife” following logically from the common law public trust doctrine.1
The core of the public trust doctrine—generally traced back to Roman
law—is that the state lacks the authority to alienate or abrogate its control of public trust resources on behalf of the public2 and, in its strongest
formulations, has an affirmative duty to exercise “continuing supervision” over their management3 to preserve them as fully as possible.4 In

1. See Susan Morath Horner, Embryo, Not Fossil: Breathing Life into the Public Trust in
Wildlife, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 23 (2000); Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Wildlife
Trust: A Reinterpretation of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 34 ENVTL. L. 605 (2004);
Deborah G. Musiker et al., The Public Trust and Parens Patriae Doctrines: Protecting Wildlife in
Uncertain Political Times, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 87 (1995); Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a
Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to Include Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723
(1989).
2. Meyers, supra note 1, at 728. One basic legal reference offers a very general core
idea for the doctrine: “some kinds of property must be publicly-controlled to serve certain
public purposes.” 1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUB. NAT. RESOURCES L. § 8:27 (1st ed. 2007).
3. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal.
1983). Also popularly referred to as the “Mono Lake Case.”
4. Other commentators, in myriad law review articles on the public trust doctrine,
have offered an intriguing variety of more conceptual bases for the doctrine. In his seminal
and highly influential 1970 article introducing the idea of using the public trust doctrine as
a tool for judicial protection of natural resources, Professor Joseph Sax asserted that the
“central substantive thought” in public trust litigation is:
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the
general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any
government conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that resource
to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties.
Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 490 (1970) [hereinafter Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resources Law] (emphasis in original). Elsewhere:
[The] idea of public trusteeship rests upon three related principles. First,
that certain interests—like the air and the sea—have such importance to
the citizenry as a whole that it would be unwise to make them the subject
of private ownership. Second, that they partake so much of the bounty of
nature, rather than of individual enterprise, that they should be made
freely available to the entire citizenry without regard to economic status.
And, finally, that it is a principle purpose of government to promote the
interests of the general public rather than to redistribute public goods
from broad public uses to restricted private benefit.
JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION 165 (Knopf
1970). Other takes include: an “amorphous” concept which holds that the public is vested
with certain rights in certain natural resources. Richard Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of
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the view of these advocates, the application of the doctrine to wildlife
and other natural resources is desirable to usher in an “ecosystemic”
framework for resource management,5 and more philosophically, a “new
ethical framework” for environmental decision-making.6
The source of the modern American public trust doctrine was the
U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition, in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois,7 of
a public trust held by states over navigable waterways, for the purposes
of navigation, commerce, and fishing. Following Illinois Central, most
states recognize this minimal public trust doctrine, and many states have
expanded its recognition to the closely related resource of surface waters.8 Many states further recognize a statutory or common law ownership of wildlife resources.9 If a state holds wildlife on behalf of its

Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA
L. REV. 631, 632 (1986); a “catalyst for social change” in the allocation of natural resources.
Timothy Patrick Brady, “But Most of It Belongs to Those Yet to Be Born:” The Public Trust
Doctrine, NEPA, and the Stewardship Ethic, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 621, 623 (1989–90); as
used in decisions by courts, specifically in the “Mono Lake Case,” a “clever catalyst for
compromise,” after which “the ‘real’ public trust doctrine is defined by parties’ and decision makers’ non-litigation actions in light of judicially-determined general principles.”
Craig Anthony Arnold & Leigh A. Jewell, Litigation’s Bounded Effectiveness and the Real Public Trust Doctrine: The Aftermath of the Mono Lake Case, 8 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 1, 4, 14, 22 (2001). See generally Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public
Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351 (1998); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust:
Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 426 & n.3
(1989).
5. Meyers, supra note 1, at 724–25 (defining “ecosystemic” as “an approach that allows resource managers to consider both the short-term and long-term needs of wildlife,
the health of the habitat upon which a specific species or variety of species depend for
survival, and the needs and goals of those humans who interact with wildlife in the
ecosystem.”).
6. Id. at 733 (describing this as “a movement away from the perception of humankind
and nature as separate entities, with humans as manipulators and controllers of nature, and
toward a philosophic base that recognizes humans as part of nature.”). See generally Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S.
CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972); Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees: New
Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974). These two articles serve as the
primary sources for Meyers’ “new ethical framework.”
7. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
8. See DAVID M. GILLILAN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION: SEEKING
A BALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE 151–57 (1997) (discussing California’s application of the
doctrine to its water allocation system in the “Mono Lake Case,” and similar extensions in
Montana, Idaho, and Colorado). See also Cynthia F. Covell, A Survey of State Instream Flow
Programs in the Western United States, 1 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 177, 197 (1998). Cf. California v. Super. Ct., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276, 285–87 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (venturing legal and
philosophical considerations of the nature of the state’s “ownership” of water).
9. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The
American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 673, 709 n.241 (2005)
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citizens, the argument runs, this should imply the same sort of trusteeship that limits the state’s ability to alienate the resource and obligates
the state to preserve it.10
From a purely logical legal perspective, this conclusion seems almost tautological. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court over a century ago
asserted as a mere recognition the fact that the power and control over
wildlife lodged in the state as a result of its ownership on behalf of the
people is to be exercised “as a trust for the benefit of the people and not
as a prerogative for the advantage of the government.”11 This trusteeship
implies “the duty of the legislature to enact such laws as will best preserve the subject of the trust, and secure its beneficial use in the future to
the people of the state.”12 However, although the Court continued to invoke the state ownership rationale to uphold state regulations, it avoided
endorsing state ownership as providing exclusive and unlimited state
regulatory authority over wildlife, instead progressively weakening the
rationale13 until it was finally overturned in 1979.14
From a more inductive legal perspective, natural resource–protective statutory schemes, federal and state, often explicitly or
implicitly incorporate trust principles, as opposed to treating their subject matter as discrete “regulatory objects.”15 The National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) offers perhaps the best example. NEPA’s preamble
proclaims, as national policy, that it is the continuing responsibility of
the federal government to use all practical means to ensure that the nation may “fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations.”16 At least one commentator17
has argued that Congress’s and the Council on Environmental Quality’s
original vision of the NEPA process—as “intended to help public offi-

(listing 25 state ownership statutes along the lines of the Idaho Code’s § 36-103(a): “All
wildlife . . . within the state of Idaho, is hereby declared to be the property of the
state . . . ”).
10. See id. at 713–19 (concluding that the public trust doctrine offers “fertile opportunities” for future growth, including imposing affirmative duties on states, equipping citizens
with enforcement authority, collecting damages for injuries to wildlife, and insulating
states from takings claims).
11. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896).
12. Id. at 534.
13. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 9, at 701–06 (documenting the state ownership
rationale’s erosion from 1920 to 1979).
14. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 331–35 (1979) (holding that “challenges under
the Commerce Clause to state regulations of wild animals should be considered according
to the same general rule applied to state regulations of other natural resources . . . ”).
15. Wood, supra note 1, at 616–17.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1) (2000).
17. Brady, supra note 4, at 636, 641–45.
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cials make decisions that are based on understanding of environmental
consequences, and take actions that protect, restore, and enhance the environment”18 has been undermined by the Supreme Court’s assertion that
NEPA is “essentially procedural”19 and that federal agencies are not
bound to “elevate environmental concerns over other appropriate considerations.”20 Likewise, the federal Endangered Species Act’s (ESA) core
“jeopardy” provisions21 delegate to federal agencies the trust-like responsibility to ensure the survival and recovery of endangered and
threatened species.22 On a state level, courts have recognized in provisions of the California Water Code, for example, a “legislative expression
of the public trust,”23 in that they create affirmative duties on the part of
state agencies to provide for the preservation and even the restoration of
wildlife populations, rather than merely proscribing actions that inflict
harm on wildlife or wildlife habitat.
This distinction between proscriptive authority and affirmative
duties has evoked numerous subtle philosophical and ethical discussions
of the difference between a purely regulatory relationship between the
state and its natural resources and a more trust-oriented relationship
based on a stewardship ethic or “duty-based environmentalism.”24 This
is especially true as the “whole regulatory apparatus” implementing
American pollution control laws has begun yielding its primacy among
environmental lawyers and other advocates to what Professor Joseph

18. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
19. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558
(1978).
20. Strycker’s Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980).
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2000).
22. See Wood, supra note 1. Cf. Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
378 F.3d 1059, 1069–71 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that species conservation, including recovery, is clearly a congressionally intended goal of the ESA’s critical habitat provisions, so
that a FWS regulation defining “destruction or adverse modification” of critical habitat as
changes to critical habitat that “appreciably diminish[ ] the value of critical habitat for both
the survival and recovery of a listed species” [emphases added by court] is invalid as giving
too little protection to species habitat).
23. Cal. Trout v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 209 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989) (citing the “Mono Lake Case” at 446 n.27).
24. Brady, supra note 4, at 642 (borrowing the phrase “duty-based environmentalism”
from another commentary on NEPA: Don J. Frost, Jr., Amoco Production Co. v. Village of
Gambell and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.: Authority Warranting Reconsideration of the Substantive Goals of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 5 ALASKA L. REV. 15, 44–47 (1988)). See also William F. Pedersen,
“Protecting the Environment”—What Does That Mean?, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 969, 970 (1994)
(contending that the “compartmentalized approach” of our current regulatory structure reflects the absence of environmental goals, which in turn restricts our environmental protection efforts to “an extraordinarily narrow front.”).
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Sax has called the “New Age of Environmental Restoration.”25 In this
“New Age,” environmentalists’ main focus has shifted noticeably from
individual polluters and discharges to watersheds and ecosystems, and
their agenda from localized pollution control to biodiversity protection
and restoration.26 The notion of preserving the attributes of a healthy environment as a “trust” for future generations evokes an appropriate
sense of guardianship, responsibility, and community.27
A current prominent example should further highlight the distinction. In ongoing California litigation,28 environmentalists challenged the
entrance of California’s Departments of Forestry and Fish and Game into
the “Headwaters Agreement” of 1996. Under this agreement, lumber
companies would sell an old-growth forest—the habitat of the endangered marbled murrelet—and other land to the state and federal governments to create a permanent wildlife preserve.29 In return, the lumber
companies would be allowed to harvest their remaining timberlands
subject to the approval of certain plans and permits by state and federal
agencies under NEPA, the California Environmental Quality Act, and
the state and federal endangered species acts, culminating in the issuance of an Incidental Take Permit.30 Oversimplifying somewhat for the
sake of clarity, the environmentalists’ challenge under the statutes was
necessarily confined to whether the agencies followed proper administrative procedure. The California Court of Appeals specifically refused to

25. Joseph L. Sax, The New Age of Environmental Restoration, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 1
(2001).
26. Id.
27. Rose, supra note 4, at 351. See David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property:
A Call for Judicial Protection of the Public’s Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 378–79 (1988) (analyzing the trajectory of this shift from “conservationism” to “preservationism” in terms of courts’ increasing recognition that the “all
growth is good” rationale needs to be counterbalanced, and that the public’s interest in
ecological values has been systematically undervalued). But see Alyson C. Flournoy, In
Search of an Environmental Ethic, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 63, 94 (characterizing the doctrine
and its vision of a “rights-based ethic” as “a foundation for modern statutory law,” which
“may have contributed to the lack of attention to ethics by legal scholars for some years,”
since it seemed to provide an answer to ethical as well as legal questions). A similar revisionism appears in Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax’s
Public Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of
Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1209, 1214–17 (1991) (faulting the trust model for its inherent
conservatism, paternalism, and peculiarly masculine lack of confidence in citizens’ individual and collective responsibility for nurturing our environment, all of which he blames for
government’s failure to protect endangered environments and species).
28. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. (EPIC) v. Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d
31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
29. Id. at 38–39.
30. Id.
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address the “analytic gap” between evidence of impacts on the murrelet
and the agency decision, concluding that, “Nothing more was required”
than that the agency make specific findings on the prerequisites for the
permit.31 The environmentalists’ challenge under the public trust doctrine, by contrast, could and did include claims that the very procedures
followed by the agencies constituted an invalid abrogation of their duty
to protect wildlife. The Incidental Take Permit, for example, would prevent the Department of Fish and Game from requiring new or additional
conservation measures, while the public trust doctrine requires it to “do
everything necessary” to preserve wildlife, not simply to avoid “jeopardy” by “stopping short of species extinction.”32
In one state, Alaska, judicial recognition of a public trust in the
state’s wildlife has been relatively unproblematic. The Alaska Constitution contains provisions reserving fish, wildlife, and waters “in their natural state” to the people “for common use,”33 directing that natural
resources be “utilized, developed, and maintained on the sustained yield
principle,”34 and mandating that the legislature shall “provide for the
utilization, development, and conservation [of natural resources] for the
maximum benefit of its people.”35 The Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions as “constitutionalizing common law principles
imposing upon the state a public trust duty with regard to the management of fish, wildlife and waters.”36 Although the Alaska Constitution’s
drafters and prior Alaska decisions had relied on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s state ownership rationale, the Alaska court found that, “Nothing
in the [1979] opinion [overturning this rationale] indicated any retreat
31. Id. at 64–65.
32. Brief of Petitioners-Respondents at 100–02, Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. & Sierra Club,
2004 WL 2824571 (Nos. A104828, A105391). For the reader inclined to view the intricate
interplay of ESA and public trust principles in a less complex but still highly detailed context, a superlative source is the transcript of a 2003 California State Water Resources Board
(SWRCB) Hearing reviewing U.S. Bureau of Reclamation water rights permits: SWRCB,
Public Hearing, Phase 2: To Review the United States Bureau of Reclamation Water Rights Permits
(Application 11331 and 11332) to Determine Whether Any Modifications in Permit Terms or Conditions Are Necessary to Protect Public Trust Values and Downstream Water Rights on the Santa
Ynez River below Bradbury Dam (Cachuma Reservoir) , available at http://www.waterrights.ca.
gov/hearings/CachumaPhase2Transcript11-12-03.pdf [hereinafter Cachuma Phase II]. Of
particular interest is a portion of the transcript where attorney Karen Kraus, for the steelhead advocacy group California Trout, contrasts proposed mitigation measures to satisfy
the ESA with additional affirmative measures required by the SWRCB’s public trust responsibilities. Id. at 772–81.
33. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
34. Id. § 4.
35. Id. § 2.
36. Owsichek v. State, 763 P.2d 488, 493 (Alaska 1988). See also Pullen v. Ulmer, 923
P.2d 54, 60–61 (Alaska 1996).
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from the state’s public trust duty. . . . [T]he trust responsibility that accompanied state ownership remains.”37
In other states, however, the road toward such recognition has
been much less smooth. The occasionally encouraging court statement
often masks a much more complex trajectory of doctrinal development
away from the public trust’s expansion. For example, a Virginia federal
court’s declaration that the public trust doctrine gives the state “the right
and the duty to protect and preserve the public’s interest in natural wildlife resources”38 has been quoted in at least 17 law review articles and
cited in about 50, but it has never been referred to in a reported Virginia
decision. Meanwhile, Virginia courts have adhered to a 1932 decision rejecting the public trust doctrine as constituting, for most purposes, any
kind of extra-constitutional limitation on legislative power over natural
resources.39 They have even rejected the substance of a 1971 state constitutional amendment declaring it to be the state’s policy to “conserve, develop, and utilize its natural resources” and to “protect its atmosphere,
lands, and waters from pollution, impairment, or destruction”40 as a criterion for judicial review.41 A Virginia commentator has criticized the
courts’ hesitation to promote the public’s expressed interest in environmental protection and stewardship and their preference for deferring
“almost unconditionally” to private property rights.42 Even in less hostile
state courts, judicial recognition of a public trust in wildlife often involves pulling together decades-old precedent with questionable statutory language to create new common law rights and duties.43 No matter
how straightforward the legal argument for extension of a recognized
limited public trust doctrine to other resources may be, as its advocates
would contend, courts have in general resisted the development. Per-

37. Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 495 n.12. See also Pullen, 923 P.2d at 60 (noting that “[t]hese
important themes have been consistently reaffirmed.”).
38. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980).
39. Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 164 S.E. 689 (Va. 1932).
40. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
41. Robb v. Shockoe Slip Found., 324 S.E.2d 674, 676–77 (Va. 1985).
42. Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental Programs: A Study in Political Influence and Regulatory Failure, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 896–97 (1989–90).
43. This has unquestionably been the California experience. See generally infra notes
55–142 and accompanying text. The recently settled Friant Dam litigation, mandating restoration of a virtually extinct fishery, turned on a reinterpretation of Fish & Game Code
§ 5937 as expressing the public trust. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Patterson, 333. F.
Supp. 2d 906 (E.D. Cal. 2004). See also Nathan Matthews, Rewatering the San Joaquin River: A
Summary of the Friant Dam Litigation, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1109 (2007); Robert B. Firpo, The Plain
“Dam!” Language of Fish & Game Code Section 5937: How California’s Clearest Statute Has Been
Diverted from Its Legislative Mandate, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1349, 1371–72
(2008).
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haps with an eye to averting the potentially multiplying challenges to
state agency action or inaction, they have sometimes chosen to ignore or
severely limit their own doctrines, or to eschew the logical and legal consequences of these doctrines once announced.
Repeating the logical legal arguments for an extension of the public trust doctrine, therefore, may be less indicative of a possible public
trust in wildlife than offering a representative history of their recent progress within those states whose courts have given the possibility the richest and most serious attention. After a brief orientation to the key
principles behind the doctrine’s operation, a survey in six key states—
California, Idaho, Michigan, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and Washington—will show that for practically every case expressing sympathy with
this extension, there has been an equal and opposite reaction against the
extension. At present, the public trust in wildlife is an intriguing notion,
often with far-reaching and fascinating implications. But it is far from a
reality, even where the public trust doctrine’s basic principles have been
embraced.
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine is generally described as having an ancient pedigree, with roots in the Justinian Institutes of Roman law and a
more than century-old recognition by the U.S. Supreme Court in Illinois
Central Railroad v. Illinois.44 The doctrine has been invoked to supply constitutional or common law support for different, though sometimes overlapping, state (or private) powers or limitations. First, the doctrine has
been invoked to confer standing on members of the general public to
challenge public grants or private misuses of public trust resources. Second, the doctrine can support a state’s authority to regulate public trust
resources or activities on public trust lands. Sometimes, as in California,
once that authority has been embodied in statutes or regulations, the full
panoply of common law public trust theory inheres in these statutes or
regulations and becomes a vital force in agency enforcement actions.
Other times, as will be seen, the enforcing agencies and the courts choose
to neglect the public trust underpinnings and confine their focus to statutory or regulatory interpretation. Third, the doctrine can be invoked as a
limitation on a state’s authority to alienate property in derogation of its
public trust obligations. Fourth, the doctrine can be recognized as pro44. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). But see James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A
History of the Public Trust Doctrine 7–13, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (2008) (reviewing
Roman law and finding that this pedigree for the doctrine’s restraint on alienability of
lands and waters was “made impossible by the basic premise of Roman Law,” which was
the Emperor’s absolute power to make law).
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viding an affirmative argument, or even an independent cause of action—sometimes called “breach of trust”—to prevent a state from
wasting a natural resource. Fifth, and finally, the doctrine is often used
by a state as a defense to a Fifth Amendment inverse condemnation
action.
The central question for this article’s purposes in these five areas
must be whether wildlife and the conservation of wildlife habitat qualify
as constituents of the public trust obligation. This simple-sounding issue
actually has three dimensions, because the public trust doctrine itself has
three dimensions, which are usually discussed as (1) its geographic
scope; (2) its protected uses; and (3) its duties or obligations.
The threshold inquiry before considering how the doctrine is to be
applied is to determine the geographic zone, or scope, of public trust
obligations. Traditionally, states have recognized public trust rights in
state coastal waters reaching to the mean high-tide line, and in navigable
inland bodies of water to the ordinary high-water mark.45 The U.S. Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,46 further acknowledged that the states are free to narrow or expand the zone of public
trust protection.47 Accordingly, some state courts, such as Idaho’s, have
flirted with the idea of extending the trust to cover other resources besides waterways or the essential areas around waterways, such as
wildlife.48
Once the geographic scope has been defined, the second dimension of the doctrine is determining what uses (or purposes) are permitted, restricted, or protected within it.49 This sounds simple, but it is both
conceptually and practically a complex matter, often involving several
uses competing with one another. Judicial determinations of protected
uses are generally made on an ad hoc basis and can vary greatly among
the states.50 Traditionally, the protected public trust uses included only
commerce, navigation, and fishing.51 As with the geographic scope of the
doctrine, however, state courts are free to expand the protected uses in
accordance with changing public needs and values. The California courts

45. JACK H. ARCHER ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE & THE MANAGEMENT OF
AMERICA’S COASTS 15–16 (Univ. of Mass. 1994).
46. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
47. Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 476.
48. See Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085
(Idaho 1983).
49. ARCHER ET AL., supra note 45, at 22.
50. Id.
51. See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
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have been at the forefront of such expansion, recognizing ecological
preservation as a protected use.52
The bare recognition of preservation as a protected use, taken by
itself, would do little more than support the state in its authority to decline committing a trust resource to a use incompatible with preservation. The great leap forward made by the California Supreme Court in
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County in 1983 was to
find in this doctrinal development “an affirmation of the duty of the state
to protect the people’s common heritage.”53 The doctrinal shift from permitting certain uses on public trust lands to affirmatively protecting natural resources is “a significant change in the public trust doctrine’s
traditional focus.”54 The precise affirmative duties or obligations of the
state as trustee—the third dimension of the doctrine’s development—
have unfortunately been rarely discussed by the courts, but since future
generations are among the trust’s intended beneficiaries, these obligations must include the duty to preserve. The following discussion will
therefore address the progress in six key states in extending the scope
and the protected uses of the public trust doctrine to support wildlife
preservation efforts.
A. Public Trust Doctrine in California
California is one of the few states whose courts have explicitly
included wildlife within the scope of the public trust doctrine. In San
Diego County Archaeological Society, Inc. v. Compadres, the court stated that
“wild game . . . has always been deemed to be owned by the people of
the state in their sovereign capacity. . . . It is from this common ownership that the public trust arises.”55 The plaintiffs in Compadres were seeking to apply public trust protection to archaeological artifacts by
analogizing them to wild animals. The source for the court’s dictum, refuting the analogy but affirming the public trust in wildlife, was Ex parte
Maier,56 which has provided support for several other states’ grants of

52. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). See also Kootenai, 671 P.2d at 1088
(proclaiming the public trust “dynamic, rather than static” and “destined to expand with
the development and recognition of new public uses.”).
53. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983).
54. ARCHER ET AL., supra note 45, at 26.
55. San Diego County Archaeological Soc’y, Inc. v. Compadres, 146 Cal Rptr. 786, 789
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978), disagreed with on other grounds by L.A. v. Venice Peninsula Properties,
644 P.2d 792, 798 n.11 (Cal. 1982) (disapproving dictum that “to the effect that the public
trust doctrine applies only to property to which the state has at one time held title”).
56. 37 P. 402 (Cal. 1894).
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protection to wildlife as a public resource.57 Maier itself was a habeas
corpus case, in which the petitioner challenged his detention for violating
the statute prohibiting the sale of deer meat by contending that the prohibition was beyond the state’s police power. The court responded that
“wild game within a state belongs to the people in their collective, sovereign capacity; . . . they may, if they see fit, absolutely prohibit the taking
of it, or any traffic or commerce in it, if deemed necessary for its protection or preservation, or the public good.”58
The asserted inclusion of wildlife within the public trust also
springs from section 1801 of the California Fish and Game Code, which
declares the state’s policy to be “to encourage the preservation, conservation, and maintenance of wildlife resources under the jurisdiction and
influence of the state . . . for their intrinsic and ecological values,” besides their economic, recreational, and aesthetic benefits.59 In Betchart v.
California Department of Fish & Game,60 the court relied on section 1801
and Maier in affirming the state’s power to reasonably regulate wildlife
and patrol for violations. “The state has the duty to preserve and protect
wildlife [as a] publicly-owned resource.”61 Another illegal possession
case after Compadres—People v. Harbor Hut Restaurant62— placed wildlife
protection provisions even more firmly within the tradition of environmental protection case law. The Harbor Hut court cited the seminal
CEQA case Friends of Mammoth63 for the proposition that the California
“Supreme Court has recognized the importance attached to the goal of
preserving and protecting this state’s natural resources.”64 The court
found it “beyond dispute” that the state holds title to its wildlife, just as it
does its tidelands, “in public trust for the benefit of the people” and even
quoted the recently decided National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of
Alpine County’s recitation of the “dominant theme” of the state’s obliga-

57. See, e.g., State v. Theriault, 41 A. 1030, 1033 (Vt. 1898); Sherwood v. Stephens, 90 P.
345, 346 (Idaho 1907); Harper v. Galloway, 51 So. 226, 228 (Fla. 1910); State v. Tice, 125 P.
168, 169 (Wash. 1912); State v. Morgan, 63 So. 509, 510 (La. 1913); People v. Zimberg, 33
N.W.2d 104, 106 (Mich. 1948).
58. Maier, 37 P. at 404.
59. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 1801 (West 1998).
60. 205 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
61. Id. at 135–36.
62. 196 Cal. Rptr. 7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
63. Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors of Mono County, 502 P.2d 1049, 1056
(Cal. 1972) (holding that the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) should be “interpreted in such a manner as to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment
within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.”).
64. Harbor Hut, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
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tions being its “duty to exercise continued supervision” to prevent parties from using trust resources in a harmful manner.65
As with many other states, then, California courts have had little
difficulty justifying the use of the state’s police power to regulate wildlife. What is always more problematic is the recognition of an affirmative
public trust obligating the state to take measures for wildlife preservation and providing a “breach of trust” cause of action to the public when
the state offers insufficient protection. The bundling in Harbor Hut of the
public trust in wildlife with the traditional trust in tidelands, taken at
face value, may mean that the former inherits all the protections due the
latter, even though the courts have cautioned that “[t]he consequences of
characterizing an interest of the state as a trust interest are not uniform.”66 California’s formulation of this traditional public trust doctrine
thus warrants some review.
The outlines of the involved history of the public trust doctrine in
California can be traced through four landmark cases. First, in People v.
California Fish Co.,67 the California Supreme Court adopted what has been
termed its recurrent “title-oriented approach” to analyzing public trust
issues.68 The state had granted thousands of acres of coastal tidelands to
private individuals for development, under statutory provisions permitting the sale of swamp and tidelands that were designed to promote reclamation and agriculture and not “in pursuance of any design to
promote, regulate, or control” the recognized public trust use of navigation.69 California had already conveyed perhaps 80,000 acres of tidelands
to private parties over roughly the previous half-century.70 Since these
grants were not made to promote trust purposes, the court could have
applied Illinois Central’s remedy and invalidated them outright. Instead,
the court held that the grants were valid and the grantees took an encumbered fee simple; because the legislature could not alienate the public trust easement over tidelands without a “clearly expressed or
necessarily implied” intention to do so, the state retained the right to
“enter upon and possess the same for the preservation and advancement
of the public uses. . . . ”71 The various principles stated in California Fish
65. Id. (quoting Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 721
(Cal. 1983)).
66. Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 212 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989).
67. 138 P. 79 (Cal. 1913).
68. Rose Young, The Public Trust Doctrine in California, Florida and New Jersey: A Critique
of Its Role in Modern Land Use Law, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1349, 1355–56 (1989).
69. Cal. Fish, 138 P. at 83.
70. Berkeley v. Super. Ct. of Alameda County, 606 P.2d 362, 367 n.9 (Cal. 1980).
71. Cal. Fish, 138 P. at 88.
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emerged for later courts as two rules: “(1) The state may make an absolute grant of tidelands to private parties when to do so is to promote
navigation and commerce; and (2) Grants to private persons not for this
purpose do not pass title free of the trust, but rather title is taken subject
to the trust.”72
California Fish retained the traditional concept of the public trust’s
scope as limited to navigable waterways and their protected uses for
commerce, navigation, and fishing. Over a half-century after California
Fish, during America’s “environmental decade” of the 1970s, the California courts embarked on expanding the latter rule. The second landmark
case, Marks v. Whitney,73 concerned a title dispute between private parties
as to tidelands and so had no reason to disturb the traditional scope of
the trust, but it radically expanded its protected uses. The court noted
cases through the mid-twentieth century recognizing rights included in
public trust “easements” to “fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating
and general recreation purposes.”74 But the court went on to note the
“flexible” nature of public trust uses to “encompass changing public
needs”:
In administering the trust the state is not burdened
with an outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization over another. There is a growing public recognition that
one of the most important public uses of the tidelands—a use
encompassed within the tidelands trust—is the preservation
of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as
ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and
marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate
of the area.75

Further, the state’s authority to “control, regulate and utilize”
public trust resources in furtherance of valid trust purposes, such as
those suggested above, is “absolute.”76 Conversely, however, not even
the California courts have the power to restrain or bar a member of the
public from “asserting or in any way exercising public trust uses,”77 as

72. Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1093
(Idaho 1983).
73. 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971).
74. Id. at 380 (citation omitted).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 381.
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the lower court in Marks v. Whitney had done by denying standing to a
neighboring landowner claiming a public trust cause of action.78
The third landmark case, Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda
County,79 revisited the California Fish issue of whether and how the state
can convey tidelands free of the public trust, and the court reiterated
California Fish’s “[t]wo distinct rules.”80 The court again refused to invalidate grants of a public trust resource but instead concluded that the
grantee will “hold it subject to the public trust.”81 The crucial question in
Berkeley was how to deal with well-established investor and landowner
expectations, since California had long ago conveyed most of its tidelands and other public trust property. Rather than apply a doctrinaire
approach, the court chose to “balance the interests” between preexisting
uses and the parties’ expectations.82 The principle emerging from Berkeley
was that “the interests of the public are paramount in property that is
still physically adaptable for trust uses, whereas the interests of the
grantees and their successors should prevail insofar as the tidelands
have been rendered substantially valueless for those purposes.”83 Steering this pragmatic middle course actually strengthened the doctrine; it
avoided pitting environmental values directly against the “value of investments,” and also avoided consigning the doctrine to the status of an
“academic exercise,” which a purely prospective application would have
done.84 One commentator noted that the decision “managed to maintain
the existing social, economic and environmental equilibrium.”85
The final case in this quartet, a landmark not only for California
but for the nation as a whole, addressed the authority of members of the
public to challenge even legitimate state government allocations of public trust resources that seemed to conflict with the expanded purposes
recognized in Marks v. Whitney. National Audubon Society v. Superior Court
of Alpine County86 concerned environmentalists’ challenge of a 40-yearold water diversion permit granted by California’s Water Resources
agency to the City of Los Angeles, allowing it to appropriate almost the
entire tributary flow into ecologically important and unique Mono Lake
in the eastern Sierra Nevada mountains. The California Supreme Court
candidly noted that it had been called on to reconcile “two systems of
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See id.
606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980).
Id. at 366.
Id. at 372.
Young, supra note 68, at 1358–59.
Berkeley, 606 P.2d at 373.
See id.
Young, supra note 68, at 1359.
658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
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legal thought” that had been on a “collision course” since Marks v.
Whitney recognized “that the public trust protects environmental and
recreational values”; namely, between the public trust doctrine and California’s appropriative water rights system.87 Perhaps more rigorously
than in any other American decision, the National Audubon court examined the scope, the purposes, and the duties of the public trust. First,
the court suggested that the scope of the trust extended geographically
as far as any activity that can inflict damage on a protected public trust
use. Second, in the controversy at hand, this only applied to nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters, but because the court followed Marks
v. Whitney’s conception of the protection of ecological values as a “clear”
public trust purpose, the expansion could theoretically be vast. Third,
and most importantly for future verbal formulations of the doctrine, the
National Audubon court derived from Illinois Central, California Fish, and
Berkeley’s inalienable and “continuing power” over trust lands a continuing and affirmative duty on the state to protect public trust resources, so
that resource allocations could be revisited as circumstances and, impliedly, public values and priorities changed:
Thus, the public trust is more than an affirmation of
state power to use public property for public purposes. It is an
affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the
abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of
the trust.88

The “core of the public trust doctrine is the state’s authority as sovereign
to exercise a continuous supervision and control” over trust waters and
lands.89
As in Berkeley, the court refused to apply to its full extent a doctrine which would “occupy the field” of water allocation and displace
and disrupt the appropriative rights system and already existing appropriations “essential to the economic development of this state.”90 Instead,
the court affirmed the Water Resources agency’s power to make water
allocations, even when these may unavoidably harm public trust values.
However, the state also has an “affirmative duty” to consider public trust
values, to protect them “whenever feasible,” to retain “continuing supervision” over allocation decisions, and to reconsider decisions “even

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

712.
724.
712.
727.
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though those decisions were made after due consideration of their effect
on the public trust.”91 In connection with these duties, some commentators have seen great importance in the court’s assumption that citizen
activists would have standing to challenge agency decisions, acting as a
sort of quasi-institutional watchdog over environmental values.92
Returning to California wildlife doctrine, after this remarkable expansion of California’s public trust, wildlife preservation advocates expected to be able to argue successfully that if the state has failed to
adequately consider wildlife values in its allocation decisions, or if circumstances have changed so as to invoke the state’s “continuing supervision,” then its action or inaction is subject to judicial intervention. For
instance, if the Department of Fish and Game has granted a lumber company an Incidental Take Permit improperly in view of the potential harm
to wildlife, one would expect the public trust doctrine to provide a remedy.93 Environmental Protection Information Center’s environmentalist challengers argued from Maier through Betchart that the public trust doctrine
encompasses wildlife, then cited National Audubon’s recognition that
state agencies retained—and the public trust imposed—the duty to exercise “the power to reexamine decisions in light of later circumstances.”94
By assuring the lumber company it would forbear in enforcing endangered species protections, the Department of Fish and Game had ceded
this power and violated the public trust.95 The California Court of Appeals, however, placed a practical limit on the doctrine’s invocation.
While recognizing the state’s “policy of wildlife preservation,” the court
rejected Fish and Game’s “extra-statutory powers” purportedly deriving
from its status as trustee.96 The public trust doctrine does “empower[ ]
and obligate the State to take charge of wildlife resources.”97 But the state
can discharge its responsibilities by establishing “regulatory schemes to
protect the state’s wildlife,” which it has done with CEQA, the state’s

91. Id. at 727–28.
92. See, e.g., Young, supra note 68, at 1361; Geoffrey R. Scott, The Expanding Public Trust
Doctrine: A Warning to Environmentalists and Policy Makers, 10 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 48
n.140 (1998) (citing Nat’l Audubon as the prime example of the “small number of states” that
“have permitted individuals to sue to enforce a public trust.”).
93. See Cal. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d
31 ( Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Brief of Petitioners-Respondents on Appeal at 97–99, Cal. Envtl.
Prot. Info. Ctr., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 31 (Nos. A104828, A105391), 2004 WL 2824571. See also
Answering Brief of Petitioners-Respondents at 13–16, Cal. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 37 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 31 (No. S140547), 2006 WL 3908816.
94. Answering Brief of Petitioners-Respondents, supra note 93, at 15.
95. See id. at 15–16.
96. Cal. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 71.
97. Id. at 72 (emphasis in original).
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Endangered Species Act, and its Forest Practices Act.98 A public trust
challenge would only succeed where it is alleged that wildlife is being
harmed “by the absence of a regulatory scheme.”99 The California Supreme Court reversed on statutory grounds, and it avoided resolving the
public trust issue by finding that the factual record showed that the Department of Fish and Game retained its authority over lumber company
decisions.100
A California district court has also narrowly cabined the doctrine’s application in a different context. In Center for Biological Diversity,
Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc.,101 environmentalists sought a declaratory judgment and the imposition of statutory fines under the public trust doctrine against the operators of wind power turbines at Altamont Pass; the
turbines allegedly kill more than a thousand migratory raptors each
year. The court dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action.102
While it noted National Audubon’s assertion that “any member of the general public has standing to raise a claim of harm to the public trust,” the
court distinguished this case from the National Audubon line by noting its
lack of connection to waterways and asserting (perhaps inaccurately)
that appellate courts have consistently refused to expand the doctrine
beyond the traditional interest in navigation, at least in private suits.103
Even if wildlife is public trust property, the court continued, this only
supports the state’s regulatory and enforcement actions, not private actions by members of the public.104 According to the Center’s attorney,
this ruling “conflicts with more than 100 years of California Supreme
Court rulings” and “guts citizen enforcement of the public trust in wildlife.”105 Where the State is the plaintiff in a similar action, its proprietary
interest in the state’s wildlife is sufficiently concrete to support standing.106 Indeed, California Attorney General Bill Lockyer asserted the

98. Id.
99. See id.
100. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 187 P.3d 888 (Cal. 2008).
The court did say that the government’s duty to protect wildlife was “primarily statutory”
and suggested that the public trust doctrine was limited to “water resources,” but it was
still “intertwined with the protection of wildlife.” Id. at 73–74.
101. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., No. RG04-183113, 2006 WL
2987634 (Cal. Super. Ct. dismissed Oct. 12, 2006).
102. Id. at 17.
103. Id. at 15.
104. Id. at 16–17.
105. Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Judge Dismisses Altamont Pass Bird
Kill Lawsuit (Oct. 17, 2006), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/swcbd/PRESS/altamont10-17-2006.html (last visited June 10, 2009).
106. People ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. C 04-02588 CRB, 2005 WL 1630020,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
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state’s public trust interest in all of California’s natural resources, including its waters, snow pack, coastline, and wildlife, when filing a claim for
damages due to climate change against six major vehicle
manufacturers.107
In California, as in other states with powerful environmental protection statutes, what can often mask the application of public trust principles in any given challenge of state or private action is that the public
trust doctrine has been given legislative expression in these statutes;
challengers will typically rely on the more definite application of statutory texts rather than the relatively indefinite application of a common
law doctrine. Foremost among these statutes is the California Environmental Quality Act, adopted in 1970 following NEPA’s enactment the
previous year and modeled after the federal statute. CEQA requires
agencies to “take all action necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and enhance
the environmental quality of the state” and to “[e]nsure that the longterm protection of the environment . . . shall be the guiding criterion in
public decisions.”108 One commentator has noted that NEPA’s substantive policy goals reflected a strong public trust element, but that these
were buried in a “narrow procedural requirement,” so that the statute
suffers from a “split personality.”109 Whereas NEPA’s substantive public
trust content has been consistently diluted by the U.S. Supreme Court,110
the California Supreme Court has concluded that CEQA should be interpreted so as “to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment
within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.”111
In contrast to the California public trust doctrine’s affirmative
duty of “continuing supervision,” CEQA’s operation is primarily prospective. However, courts have made exceptions where a previously approved project is expanded or enlarged,112 or even when CEQA’s
apparent legislative intent to require review of actions having a “significant effect on the environment” seems to mandate it.113 Other statutes
107. Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Judgment and Demand for Jury Trial,
Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. General Motors Co. (N.D. Cal. 2006), available at http://ag.ca.gov/
newsalerts/cms06/06-082_0a.pdf.
108. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21,001 (West 2007).
109. Brady, supra note 4, at 636–37.
110. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558
(declaring NEPA “essentially procedural”).
111. Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors of Mono County, 502 P.2d 1049, 1056
(Cal. 1972).
112. See Nacimiento Reg’l Water Mgmt. Advisory Comm. v. Monterey County Water
Res. Agency, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
113. County of Inyo v. Yorty, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377, 384–85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). See generally Joel T. Perlstein, Substantive Enforcement of the California Environmental Quality Act, 69
CAL. L. REV. 112 (1981).
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giving legislative expression to the public trust include, most notably,
California Fish and Game Code section 5937, mandating that dam owners allow sufficient water to pass through to keep fish below the dam in
“good condition”; this section’s offspring, section 5946, was recognized
as a “specific legislative rule concerning the public trust.”114 The former
statute’s public trust character was in fact the basis of a more recent
landmark decision mandating just the type of mammoth reversal of state
appropriative action that has characterized the public trust from Illinois
Central to National Audubon. In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Patterson,115 a federal district court held that section 5937 required the “reestablishment [of a] dry stream’s historic fishery,” specifically requiring that
the Central Valley Project, which had drained the San Joaquin River dry
for half a century at Friant Dam, fulfill its duty to provide water to restore a long nonexistent salmon population in the river.116
Although, in the water arena at least, most of the progress toward
wildlife protection has come from the judiciary rather than the legislative
or executive branches, California agencies have placed public trust considerations at the forefront of their mandates, at least nominally. The influential “Racanelli decision” shortly after National Audubon confirmed
that the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) “unquestionably
possessed legal authority under the public trust doctrine” to exercise
continuing supervision over water appropriators “to protect fish and
wildlife.”117 The SWRCB includes as part of its 2005 Water Plan Update a
broad historical and policy article on the public trust, which asserts that
“wild creatures are protected” and cites Maier to support that the “control and regulation” are to be exercised as a trust for the people.118 The
State Lands Commission “administers public trust lands pursuant to
statute and the Public Trust Doctrine.”119 The Department of Fish and
Game acknowledges in its Strategic Plan: “[I]t must conserve wildlife
within a broad responsibility of governing. . . . The public trust doctrine
is not just another legal article, it is the guiding principle that binds gov114. Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 191, 209, 213
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
115. 333 F. Supp. 2d 906 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
116. See id. at 918.
117. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 201 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986). See also Jan Stevens, Instream Uses Twenty-Five Years Later: Incremental Progress or Revolving Door?, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 393, 400–01 (2005).
118. Jan S. Stevens, Applying the Public Trust Doctrine to River Protection, in 4 CALIFORNIA
WATER PLAN UPDATE 2005 (California Dept. of Water Res. ed., 2005) (Paper presented at
University of California at Davis, June 9, 2004) available at http://www.waterplan.water.ca.
gov/docs/cwpu2005/vol4/vol4-environment-applyingpublictrustdoctrine.pdf.
119. CAL. STATE LANDS COMM’N, PUBLIC TRUST POLICY 1 (2001), available at http://www.
slc.ca.gov/Policy_Statements/Public_Trust/Public_Trust_Policy.pdf.
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ernment to the people it serves.”120 Despite these professions, there have
been allegations that the Department of Fish and Game’s “progressive
politicization” had led to “neglect of its trustee responsibility” and “public distrust.”121
Whether or not the public trust in wildlife is a major agency motivator, it must be considered in these agencies’ decisions regarding
other public trust resources. In most cases, this consideration has been
mandated by statutes enacted in the wake of Marks v. Whitney and National Audubon. Section 1736 of the Water Code, for example, codifies the
SWRCB’s duty to consider public trust uses such as fish, wildlife, and
habitat preservation when approving a petition for a water rights transfer. The SWRCB relied on section 1736 to impose salinity restrictions for
the Salton Sea on a transfer from Imperial Valley to San Diego.122 Environmentalists challenging the transfer argued that the SWRCB should
have considered the public trust doctrine in addition to the statutory criteria, but the SWRCB’s review concluded that they are practically coextensive.123 In the absence of a statute, the National Audubon formulation
still applies, and the “state must bear in mind its duty as trustee to consider the effect of the taking on the public trust, and to preserve, so far as
consistent with the public interest, the uses protected by the trust.”124
One final issue, recently the subject of heated judicial controversy,
is the possibility that state action taken to conserve wildlife can constitute a Fifth Amendment “taking” of private property interests. In Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States,125 the U.S. Court of Federal Claims held that in the important context of water rights, “a mere
restriction on use—the hallmark of a regulatory action—completely eviscerates the right” and is tantamount to a physical occupation.126 In Tulare
Lake, the SWRCB had cited its public trust doctrine authority in waiving
water quality standards and imposing water diversion restrictions in an
effort to preserve Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta smelt and Chinook

120. Cal. Dep’t of Fish & Game, Fish and Game Strategic Plan, http://www.dfg.ca.
gov/about/strategy/docs/1995-Strategic-Plan.html (last visited June 10, 2009) [hereinafter
California Fish and Game Strategic Plan] (emphasis in original).
121. Jack C. Fraser, AZ. WILDLIFE NEWS, Spring 1997, at 5, quoted in Horner, supra note 1,
at 45 n.104 (2000).
122. Order Denying Reconsideration of and Modifying Order, In re Imperial Irrigation
District’s (IID) and San Diego Water Joint Petition, No. WRO 2002-0016, 2001 WL 34773897,
at *1–*2 (Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. Dec. 20, 2001).
123. Id. at 13.
124. State Water Res. Control Bd. Cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 272 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(emphasis and internal quotations omitted).
125. 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001).
126. Id. at 318–19.
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salmon under the federal ESA.127 Although not a state case, Tulare Lake’s
holding that such mandatory or discretionary agency actions require
compensation, raised the specter of discouraging aggressive protective
action. It also seemed troublesome in characterizing the agency action as
a physical occupation rather than a “regulatory taking”; for the latter, the
U.S. Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council had created
a “categorical” per se taking when a property owner has been ordered “to
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common
good.”128
However, the Lucas Court had made exceptions to the per se rule
where the regulation prevents a nuisance or is otherwise grounded in a
state’s “background principles” of property law.129 A convincing argument has been made by many commentators that the public trust doctrine epitomizes such a “background principle,” due to its longstanding
and consistent application and other reasons.130 Before Tulare Lake, the
California courts followed this approach. In Sierra Club v. Department of
Forestry & Fire Protection,131 for example, the defendant state agency had
approved timber harvest plans for the co-defendant lumber company in
old-growth forests without the mitigation measures proposed by the Department of Fish and Game to protect the spotted owl, the northern goshawk, and other rare birds, mammals, and amphibians.132 The court
found the lumber company’s claim that these measures amounted to takings “misplaced” and “inconsistent with precedents dealing with wildlife
protection,” which have consistently supported state and federal regulation.133 Though the Court found Lucas troubling, its per se rule would not
apply to the case at hand because “wildlife regulation of some sort has
been historically a part of the preexisting law of property.”134
Another Court of Federal Claims expressly rejected the Tulare Lake
approach as “wrong,” “incomplete,” or “distinguishable” in Klamath Irrigation District v. United States,135 in which irrigation districts cited Tulare
Lake in claiming that reductions in irrigation diversions in Oregon and
California, pursuant to U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National

127. Id. at 315–16.
128. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1019 (1992) (emphasis in
original).
129. Id. at 1029–31.
130. See, e.g., Zachary C. Kleinsasser, Public and Private Property Rights: Regulatory and
Physical Takings and the Public Trust Doctrine, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 421, 427–44 (2005).
131. 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
132. Id. at 340.
133. Id. at 344–46.
134. Id. at 346–47.
135. 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 538 (2005).
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Marine Fisheries Service biological opinions to protect Coho salmon and
two freshwater fish, constituted compensable takings.136 The court asserted that plaintiffs’ economic interests in water rights can only be
property rights if state law recognizes them as such, and that under both
Oregon and California law, “water ‘belongs to the public’ and is held in
trust by the states.”137 Even if plaintiffs’ diversions were assured by contract, Tulare Lake erred in treating contract rights as absolute rather than
limited by “some other state law principle.” Without mentioning the
public trust doctrine by name, the Klamath court noted that the Tulare
Lake court had failed to consider whether water use could violate “accepted state doctrines” designed to “protect fish and wildlife.”138 In other
words, since wildlife conservation is a protected public trust use, and the
state’s waters are securely within the public trust doctrine’s scope, a land
or water rights owner’s economic and contract interests are assumed to
remain subject to wildlife needs. A California court of appeal placed Klamath’s reasoning within California law and similarly disclaimed Tulare
Lake in Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial.139 Though not a wildlife case,
Allegretti noted that Tulare Lake had awarded compensation for interests
that may not even exist, since purported property interests are limited by
state doctrines protecting fish and wildlife.140 The court rejected in turn
the plaintiff’s theories for a physical taking, a categorical regulatory taking, and under the ad hoc Penn Central factors141 protecting “investmentbacked expectations” from unreasonable interference.142
The recent lack of clarity in the California courts’ application of
the public trust doctrine to wildlife protection seems to reflect the doctrine’s continued evolution and vibrancy rather than the retrenchment
experienced in other states.143 California remains one of the few states
whose judiciary will countenance public and private suits challenging
both public and private actions insufficiently protective of wildlife as
both a public trust purpose and a public trust resource within the doctrine’s scope.

136. Klamath, 67 Fed. Cl. at 513–14.
137. Id. at 515.
138. Id. at 538.
139. 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
140. Id. at 131–32.
141. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
142. Richard Frank, The Dog That Didn’t Bark, Imperial Water, I Love L.A., and Other Tales
from the California Takings Litigation Front, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 517, 520–24 (2007).
143. See infra notes 144–223 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine’s acceptance and eventual erosion in Idaho and Michigan). The noncommittal recent California
Supreme Court decision in the EPIC case merely delayed resolution of this obscurity. See
also Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 187 P.3d 888 (Cal. 2008).
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B. Public Trust Doctrine in Idaho
Idaho is home to one of the most famous “wildlife trust” cases,
Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club,144 which has
been characterized as holding that the state “holds all waters in trust for
benefit of the public, the trust doctrine takes precedence even over
vested water rights,” that the state “does not have power to abdicate its
role as trustee” and that “trust interests include . . . fish and wildlife
habitat,” among others.145 Idaho was also the scene of one of the most
famous legislative reversals and limitations on the scope and uses protected by the public trust—its 1996 enactment of section 58-1203, which
declared that Idaho’s public trust doctrine was “solely a limitation on the
power of the state to alienate or encumber the title to the beds of navigable waters.”146 The new law also restricted the purposes protected by the
public trust to those “provided in this chapter,” which did not include
wildlife protection.147 A large part of determining the current Idaho trend
in public trust protection for wildlife, then, must consist of untangling
Kootenai and its legislative response: What protections did the former extend to wildlife and how many of these did section 58-1203 manage to
retract?
At the core of Kootenai’s discussion of the public trust doctrine
was its consideration of the responsibilities of the Idaho Department of
Lands in disposing of public lands. The court held that the Department
of Land’s statutory authority and statutory responsibilities were not absolute, but were subject to the limitations imposed by the common law
public trust.148 The court recognized the public trust as a constitutional
limitation on legislative and agency decisions over natural resources; the
doctrine “at all times forms the outer boundaries of permissible government action with respect to public trust resources.”149
This raises the question of whether the scope and protected uses
or purposes of the public trust are similarly fixed as constitutional limits,
or whether they are determined by legislative or judicial fiat and are subject to revision. The assertion from Kootenai given above, that the trust is
“dynamic, rather than static” and “destined to expand with the development and recognition of new public uses,” suggests an expansive conception of the doctrine, but it should be noted that the court merely
144.
145.
tions of
146.
147.
148.
149.

671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983).
Alexandra B. Klass, Adverse Possession and Conservation: Expanding Traditional NoUse and Possession, 77 COLO. L. REV. 283, 320 n.184 (2006).
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1203 (2002) (emphasis added).
Id.
Kootenai, 671 P.2d at 1095.
Id.
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included this as part of an excerpt from a law review article on the trust’s
history.150 The court’s methodology suggests a more conservative response to this question. After its broad constitutional statement of the
public trust, the court looked at the statutory context for the agency’s
precise permitting responsibilities. Specifically, since the permit application at issue was for an encroachment on a lake’s surface waters for the
benefit of a yacht club, the court looked to the statute on commercial
navigational encroachments.151 This statute, and section 58-142,152 also
mentioned in the opinion, specify the protection of “fish and wildlife
habitat” as among the several purposes for which the Idaho legislature
has authorized regulation of the encroachment upon navigable lakes.
Reading Kootenai at face value, then, the protection of fish and wildlife
habitat could be only a permissible, rather than a necessary and absolute,
public trust use, and appropriate for the legislature to designate statutorily in this context.
The recognition of wildlife preservation as a protected use was
more firmly grounded in the common law public trust two years after
Kootenai, in Shokal v. Dunn.153 In Shokal, the court interpreted the “local
public interest” requirement for water appropriations under Idaho statutes154 for the first time. The court initially noted that this inquiry is related to the “larger doctrine of the public trust.”155 Citing the California
Supreme Court—but, intriguingly, not mentioning the recent National
Audubon decision—the court found in section 42-203A an “affirmative
duty to assess and protect the public interest.”156 “Public interest” is typically left undefined in such water provisions, but the court drew guidance from two sources. First, the legislature enacted section 42-1501,
which declared the preservation of minimum stream flows to be a “beneficial use,” on the same day it enacted section 42-203A, which contained
a list of public interest “uses” to be protected, with fish and wildlife
habitat heading the list. Second, the Idaho court borrowed from Alaska’s
statute, which enumerated the elements of the public interest, including
“the effect on fish and game resources.”157 The Shokal court was plainly
determined, first, to incorporate environmental values into water appropriations decisions, following National Audubon, and second, to equate

150. Id. at 1088 (quoting Roderick E. Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water
Rights Context: The Wrong Environmental Remedy, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63 (1982)).
151. Id. at 1095 (citing IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-147 (redesignated as § 58-1306 (2002)).
152. Redesignated as § 58-1301 (2002).
153. 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985).
154. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-203A(5) (2002).
155. Shokal, 707 P.2d at 448 n.2.
156. Id. at 448 (emphasis in original).
157. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080.
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the public interest with the public trust. Yet the Idaho court would not
go quite so far as the California court in emphasizing the state’s duty to
protect natural resources. Despite paraphrasing National Audubon, the
court would only go so far as to assert the Director of Water Resources’s
“considerable flexibility and authority” to consider and prioritize among
public interest uses. Reflecting section 42-203’s language, if an appropriation “will” conflict with the public trust, the director “may” reject the
application, but presumably need not absolutely.
Despite these promising signals as to public trust uses and obligations, the scope of the doctrine in Idaho has always been narrow, and it
has never been applied to lands above the “ordinary mean high water
mark” of navigable waters.158 Thus, while the protection of wildlife
habitat can be a permissible use of public trust resources, wildlife and
their habitat are not themselves recognized as public trust resources,
strictly speaking. The Idaho Supreme Court has come close to extending
the doctrine’s scope to land; one commentator remarked that the court
may not be ready to abandon the water, but it does have legs.159 In Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass’n, Inc. v. State,160 for example, the Idaho Supreme
Court was apparently willing to accept for standing under the public
trust doctrine an affidavit that a timber sale would damage trust resources by facilitating erosion into a navigable stream.161
Section 58-1203 may have been the legislature’s attempt to stem
this modest tide of expansion of the scope of the public trust beyond the
traditional navigable waterways. Passed a year after Selkirk-Priest, the
statute prohibits application of the doctrine to state trust lands, the administration of water rights, and the exercise of private property
rights.162 One commentator has asserted that this would “effectively gut”
the public trust doctrine.163 Given the public trust doctrine’s apparent
quasi-constitutional status as defining the “outer boundaries” of permissible government action, according to Kootenai, and conferring obligations which cannot be abdicated, under Illinois Central, it is doubtful

158. State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 594 P.2d 1093, 1102 (Idaho 1979). See also James M.
Kearney, Recent Statute Closing the Floodgates? Idaho’s Statutory Limitation on the Public Trust
Doctrine, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 91, 100–02 (1997).
159. Scott W. Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious?, 1 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG.
107, 107 (1986).
160. 899 P.2d 949 (Idaho 1995).
161. Id. at 954. See also Lisa Lombardi, The Public Trust Doctrine in Idaho, 33 IDAHO L.
REV. 231, 251 (1996).
162. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1203 (2002).
163. Lombardi, supra note 161, at 251. See also Stephen D. Osborne et al., Laws Governing
Recreational Access to Waters of the Columbia Basin: A Survey and Analysis, 33 ENVTL. L. 399,
428–29 (2003).
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whether it can be statutorily emptied.164 Thus far, however, section 581203 has eluded constitutional scrutiny.
Another potential pathway to a public trust in wildlife in Idaho is
its “state ownership” statute, which declares that all wildlife is “the property of the state of Idaho” and “shall be preserved, protected, perpetuated, and managed.”165 More than 30 states have such statutes, with
varying language, but Idaho’s, enacted in 1976, has a peculiarly
preservationist ring to it.166 Although the strict state ownership of wildlife was invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court,167 these statutes remain
on the books, and their parallel to trust language has led commentators
to find them conducive to a “wildlife trust” theory.168 These same commentators will admit, however, that the police power has become an alternative and arguably primary basis of government authority over
wildlife.169 And the police power alone provides only the authority to
regulate, without the affirmative duty to preserve that the public trust
theory supports and, under National Audubon, compels.170 One Idaho appellate court did actually refer to the statutory recognition of wildlife as
not only a “vital public interest” but also a “common trust.”171 However,
this was in the context of a search and seizure case, and the opinion on
which it relied emphasized the state’s “pervasive control” over natural
resource management and conservation, rather than its trustee
relationship.172
Despite a promising zenith of judicial recognition in the 1980s,
then, the public trust’s scope and protected uses have been in a defensive
and retreating posture in Idaho since the mid-1990s. Its application to
wildlife is currently doubtful without another reversal in the state’s case
law.
C. Public Trust Doctrine in Michigan
Michigan recognized the Illinois Central formulation of the public
trust doctrine in Collins v. Gerhardt.173 The Michigan Supreme Court has
very recently affirmed that the doctrine is “alive and well in Michigan”174
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Kearney, supra note 158, at 111–22.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1203 (2002).
See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 9, at 709–10 n.241 (listing state statutes).
See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332 (1970).
See, e.g., Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 9.
Id. at 713.
Id.
State v. Thurman, 996 P.2d 309, 314, 316 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999).
State v. Medley, 898 P.2d 1093, 1097 (Idaho 1995).
211 N.W. 115 (Mich. 1926).
Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Mich. 2005).
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and has clarified that it rests theoretically on the distinction between the
jus publicum, public rights in navigable waters and submerged lands, and
the jus privatum, private property rights that nevertheless remain subject
to the public trust.175
Michigan includes wildlife within the scope of the common law
public trust doctrine. The state’s authority to regulate the taking and
possession of wildlife, though long recognized, was firmly grounded in
its public trust obligations in People v. Zimberg.176 The court cited the 1894
California case Ex parte Maier:
The wild game within a state belongs to the people in their
collective, sovereign capacity. It is not the subject of private
ownership, except in so far as the people may elect to make it
so; and they may, if they see fit, absolutely prohibit the taking
of it, or traffic and commerce in it, if it is deemed necessary for
the protection or preservation, of the public good.177

The Michigan courts have expanded the scope of the doctrine to include
the protection of “fish and game habitat.”178 A court of appeals cited
Grosse Ile Township in tandem with Sax’s seminal 1970 article for the proposition that private citizens should be able to maintain actions for violations of public trust obligations on public lands, but the same court
found that the public trust doctrine should not form an independent basis for citizen standing in a public nuisance action.179
The complexion of Michigan environmental law changed dramatically with the passage and judicial interpretation of the Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970 (MEPA).180 Article IV, section 52 of the
Michigan Constitution of 1963 already provided that the “conservation
and development of the natural resources of the state are hereby declared to be of paramount public concern” and the “legislature shall provide for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources of the
state from pollution, impairment and destruction.” It was not until 1974,
however, in Oakland County v. Vanderkloot, that the Michigan Supreme
Court determined that the second clause prescribed a mandatory duty
175. Id.
176. 33 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Mich. 1948).
177. 37 P. 402, 404 (Cal. 1894).
178. Grosse Ile Twp. v. Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Co., 167 N.W.2d 311, 316 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1969).
179. White Lake Improvement Ass’n v. City of Whitehall, 177 N.W.2d 473, 476 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1970). (“no case has been cited where a court has, even for a clearly publicly
motivated group, made an exception to the ‘different in kind’ standing requirement which
for so long has been a feature of the law of public nuisance.”).
180. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 324.1701-06 (1999).
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on the legislature as opposed to being “merely Declaratory.”181 MEPA
largely fulfilled this duty by proscribing “conduct . . . likely to pollute,
impair or destroy the air, water or other natural resources or the public
trust therein . . . ” by any legal entity, public or private.182 Sax, in introducing his draft of the law, explained that the “public trust” was purposely left undefined, “to open the way to elucidation and consideration
of a wide range of problems . . . rather than to create confining
definitions.”183
Sax set forth as another of MEPA’s essential purposes the recognition of a right to environmental quality as legally enforceable by private
citizens.184 MEPA conferred standing on “any citizen” to challenge pollution, impairment, or destruction by “any person.”185 The expansion was
not merely procedural, however. The Vanderkloot court held that MEPA
provides a “source of supplementary substantive environmental law,”
prescribing the “environmental rights, duties and functions of subject entities.”186 These duties inform other administrative functions directed by
separate statutes, such that agency failure to comply with MEPA’s substantive prescriptions “may be the basis for a finding of fraud or abuse of
discretion.”187 In the context of wildlife, then, anyone’s impairment of the
public trust in wildlife and the protection of wildlife habitat could now
theoretically be challenged by any concerned party.
The practical contours of the public’s right to challenge an alleged
breach of this public trust duty remained to be defined. In Superior Public
Rights, Inc. v. State Department of Natural Resources,188 plaintiffs attempted
to raise a due process challenge to the state’s grant of public trust lands
for private commercial purposes without a public hearing. The court
held that a due process analysis was not the appropriate vehicle for the
protection of citizens’ rights; rather, citizens “must rely on their representative government to protect their interests.”189
MEPA’s apparently expansive enactment of standing has recently
been further limited by the Michigan Supreme Court’s importation of
the U.S. Constitution’s Article III “case or controversy” requirements into
what had heretofore been largely prudential standing requirements. In

181. Petition of Highway US-24, in Bloomfield Twp., Oakland County v. Vanderkloot,
220 N.W.2d 416, 425 (Mich. 1974).
182. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 324.1701 (1999).
183. SAX, supra note 4, at 248.
184. Id.
185. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 324.1701(1) (1999).
186. Vanderkloot, 220 N.W.2d at 427–28.
187. Id. at 430.
188. 263 N.W.2d 290 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
189. Id. at 295.
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Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters North America,
Inc.,190 the court struck down MEPA’s section 1701(1) provision allowing
“any person” to challenge another’s “pollution, impairment or destruction.” Disclaiming the apparent intent of MEPA to allow “private attorneys general” suits, the court asserted that environmental laws like
MEPA are to be vindicated only by persons who have suffered a real
“injury in fact” and thus “have a stake in the controversy.”191 “If the people are unhappy with how the executive branch fulfills its enforcement
functions, the remedy is not a lawsuit, but a political one at the ballot
box.”192 A dissenting justice complained that the court had “taken the
power to protect the state’s natural resources away from the people of
Michigan.”193
Even at their most expansive, however, Michigan courts have in
practice limited the public trust doctrine to supporting the state’s authority to regulate public trust resources or activities on public trust lands.
One landmark case, Michigan Oil Co. v. Natural Resources Commission,194
considered whether Michigan’s natural resources agency retained authority to veto drilling permits based on endangerment to wildlife, when
oil and gas leases had already been granted and the statutes subjected
permit applications mainly to considerations of unnecessary waste. At
issue, the court clarified, was “the scope of the authority of the [agency]
to regulate the utilization and conservation of all the state’s natural resources.”195 The court to some extent evaded recognition of an inherent
and inalienable public trust obligation by construing the term “waste”
broadly to include “the most serious permanent damage to or destruction of any and all natural resources of the state incidental to the production of oil.”196 The court did note, however, that the agency “retained its
statutory authority to fulfill its duty to the people” by regulating state
lands and resources “placed in its control and held by it as a public
trust.”197 Nor could a permit denial constitute a “taking,” since the
agency’s regulation of state lands was a proper exercise of the police
power.198
Michigan further suggested the use of the public trust doctrine as
a defense in inverse condemnation proceedings in Blue Water Isles Co. v.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

737 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 2007).
Id. at 462–63.
Id.
Id. at 469 (Weaver, J., dissenting).
249 N.W.2d 135 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
Id. at 138.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 144–45.
Id.
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Department of Natural Resources.199 The court relied on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s statement that a land use restriction is a taking only if it is not
“reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose.”200 The protection of the public trust in inland lakes and
streams and the preservation of the state’s natural resources clearly qualified under this criterion.201
A number of cases from the mid- to late-1970s elaborated on the
procedures courts must use in ruling on an alleged impairment of the
public trust under MEPA, in wildlife and other resources. Courts also
clarified the evidence of “impairment” of wildlife habitat necessary to
establish the prima facie case. In West Michigan Environmental Action
Council v. Natural Resources Commission, the Michigan Supreme Court
pointed to the wildlife’s limited numbers, its unique nature and location,
and the “apparently serious and lasting, though unquantifiable,” damage
alleged to result from exploratory oil and gas drilling.202 Lower courts
tentatively interpreted these considerations as balancing the “rarity of
the resources involved against the magnitude of the harm likely to result.”203 Courts eventually settled on the four “Portage factors” from City
of Portage v. Kalamazoo County Road Commission: Courts should compare
environmental conditions before and after a proposed action and consider (1) whether the natural resource involved is rare, unique, endangered, or has historical significance; (2) whether the resource is easily
replaceable, (for example, by replanting trees or restocking fish); (3)
whether the proposed action will have any significant consequential effect on other natural resources (for example, whether wildlife will be lost
if its habitat is impaired or destroyed); and (4) whether the direct or consequential impact on animals or vegetation will affect a critical number,
considering the nature and location of the wildlife affected.204 The court
in Kimberly Hills further directed that MEPA’s conservation mandate was
not limited to resources that are “biologically unique” or “endangered”;
rather, a “statewide perspective” of threats to wildlife in the context of
“populations and ecological communities” was necessary.205 The Portage

199. 431 N.W.2d 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
200. Id. at 58 (citing Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
127 (1978)).
201. Id.
202. W. Mich. Envtl. Action Council v. Natural Res. Comm’n, 275 N.W.2d 538, 545
(1979).
203. Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Ass’n v. Dion, 320 N.W.2d 668, 673 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982).
204. See City of Portage v. Kalamazoo County Road Comm’n, 355 N.W.2d 913, 915–16
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
205. Kimberly Hills, 320 N.W.2d at 673.
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court did not agree that a statewide, as opposed to local, perspective is
always necessary. The court imported into its “impairment” analysis a
balance from an unreported case discussed by Sax of “the rarity of the
resources involved against the magnitude of the harm likely to result.”206
There should be no similar balance of the “disadvantages against advantages of the defendant’s proposed action.”207
Ironically, what had seemed like an attempt to expand public
trust protections for wildlife in Kimberly Hills evolved into a judicially
more well-defined analysis of when wildlife is “impaired” as a “natural
resource”; public trust analysis thereafter faded into the background,
such that courts are “not empowered to enjoin any conduct which does
not rise to the level of an environmental risk proscribed by the MEPA.”208
This followed and perhaps sprang from the Michigan Court of Appeals’
clarification in Stevens v. Creek that, by the terms of MEPA, the pollution,
impairment, or destruction can be of either a natural resource or of the
public trust in that resource.209 Michigan courts conceive of these in the
“disjunctive.”210 Determination of whether a particular wildlife case fit
within the scope of MEPA thereafter collapsed into two inquiries: (1)
whether a natural resource is involved, and (2) whether the impact of the
activity on the environment rises to the level of impairment to justify the
trial court’s intervention.211 An adequate “level of impairment” is typically evaluated on Kimberly Hills’ statewide basis rather than on a local
basis.212
Perhaps coincidentally, within weeks of the Stevens pronouncement, the Michigan Supreme Court, in Bott v. Commission of Natural Resources, announced a restrictive application of the public trust doctrine to
navigable waters only, not to “other waterways or to lakes with only one
inlet or outlet.”213 In effect, then, the “public trust” has been both geographically limited and judicially and statutorily confined to ensure only
the public’s right to navigation, commerce, and fishing (the Illinois Central formulation) and to support the state’s authority to protect its air,

206. Id. (citing Payant v. Dep’t of Natural Res. (unreported), as discussed in Joseph L. Sax
& Roger L. Conner, Michigan’s Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70
MICH. L. REV. 1003, 1031–35 (1972)).
207. City of Portage, 355 N.W.2d at 916.
208. Id. at 915.
209. Stevens v. Creek, 328 N.W.2d 672, 674 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., Rush v. Sterner, 373 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
212. See id. at 186–87 n.1.
213. Bott v. Comm’n of Natural Res., 327 N.W.2d 838, 846 (Mich. 1982).
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water, and other natural resources against pollution, impairment, or destruction (under MEPA).214
Thus circumscribed, much of the public trust doctrine’s vitality
could be expected to depend on state environmental agencies’ commitment to pursuing an affirmative public trust conservation agenda. Michigan’s Department of Natural Resources (DNR), assigned by MEPA to
“protect and conserve the natural resources of this State,”215 notes in its
Wildlife Action Plan that it derives its conservation mandate from the
public trust doctrine’s recognition that it holds all wildlife for the people’s benefit.216 The DNR has recently announced notable successes in
recovering endangered species and habitats.217
Further, the DNR, under Rule 281.811(1)(g) (known simply as
“Rule 1”), insists on reviewing proposed actions for their impact on the
public trust.218 First, the DNR determines whether a proposed action falls
within the Bott limitation as impacting a navigable waterway. If so, it
next reviews a proposal under Rule 1’s common law public trust standards of navigation and fishing. Next, it determines whether a proposal
implicates Rule 1’s environmental considerations of resource protection,
which are generally best addressed under the criteria of MEPA’s provision for “Habitat Protection [in] Inland Lakes and Streams.”219 These include “uses for recreation, fish and wildlife, aesthetics, local government,
agriculture, commerce and industry.”220 Section 30106 further provides
that no proposal should be approved if it “will unlawfully impair or destroy any of the waters or other natural resources of the state.” The DNR
seems to consider this formulation as expanding the public trust “beyond the common law” and requiring a quantification of a project’s impacts on natural resources.221

214. See also MICH. ADMIN. CODE. r. 281.811(1)(g) (2000) (defining the “public trust” for
the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality to mean the right to navigate and fish
in navigable waterways, the state’s duty to preserve this right, and the public’s concern
and state’s duty to achieve natural resource protection).
215. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.501 (1999).
216. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., Wildlife Action Plan (June 2005), available at http://
www.michigan.gov/dnr/0,1607,7-153-10370_30909—-,00.html.
217. See, e.g., “Michigan’s Kirtland’s Warbler Population Continues to Grow,” http://
www.michigan.gov/dnr/0,1607,7-153-10371_10402-175411—,00.html (last visited May 5,
2009).
218. See generally Petition of Donna C. Marentay on the Permit Issued to Sanctuary of
Brills Lake, 2005 WL 1658505 (July 1, 2005).
219. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.30106 (1999).
220. Id. (emphasis added).
221. See, e.g., Petition of MARD Enterprises, Inc., 2006 WL 3038736 (Oct. 13, 2006).
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As for remedies authorized under MEPA, the Stevens court noted
that restoration of natural habitat can be a proper remedy.222 The “new
legal fiction” of the state’s “important interest in regulation and conservation of wildlife and natural resources” as a public trust also supports a
common law civil action for damages by the state against one who unlawfully takes or possesses wildlife.223
D. Public Trust Doctrine in Wisconsin
Wisconsin’s seminal public trust doctrine case was 1952’s Muench
v. Public Service Commission,224 which recognized the doctrine, supported
the public’s right to enforce the trust, and generally asserted a favorable
attitude toward its expansion. As early as 1915, Wisconsin’s Water
Power Law contained a provision requiring the predecessor to Wisconsin’s Public Service Commission, when granting a permit to construct a
dam upon a navigable stream, to find that the dam would not obstruct
navigation “or violate other public rights.”225 A 1929 amendment provided that “the enjoyment of scenic beauty” is one such public right.226
The Muench court found this statute “highly illustrative” of the “trend to
extend and protect the rights of the public to the recreational enjoyment”
of navigable waters. Even earlier, the Wisconsin court had “put itself on
record” as favoring the public trust doctrine for navigable waterways.227
The Muench case itself concerned the right of a private citizen to challenge the Commission’s decision that a county board resolution approving construction of a dam on the Namekagon River obviated the need for
it to make independent findings of the proposed dam’s effects on the
public rights to hunting, fishing, and scenic beauty. A nineteenth-century
case, Priewe v. State Land & Improvement Co.,228 had already asserted the
judiciary’s role, as against the legislature, as the final arbiter of legitimate
public purposes. On the issue of standing, the Muench court found that,
even in the absence of a direct economic interest, a private citizen can sue
to enforce the public’s right “to enjoy our navigable streams for recreational purposes, including the enjoyment of scenic beauty.”229 The 1929
statute had either created or recognized a legal right to recreational en-

222. Stevens v. Creek, 328 N.W.2d 672, 675 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Eyde v. Mich.,
267 N.W.2d 442 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)).
223. Attorney General v. Hermes, 339 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
224. 53 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1952).
225. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 31.06(3) (West 2006).
226. 1929 Wis. Sess. Laws 1024.
227. Muench, 53 N.W.2d at 517 (citing McLenna v. Prentice, 55 N.W. 764 (Wis. 1893)).
228. 67 N.W. 918 (Wis. 1896).
229. Muench, 53 N.W.2d at 522.
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joyment “that is entitled to all the protection which is given financial
rights” and the court thus anticipated Phillips Petroleum in approving the
trend in Wisconsin in “extend[ing] the rights of the general public” as to
the protected uses, if not the scope, of the public trust doctrine.230
Muench provided a framework for further development of public
rights and state duties over trust resources.231 The common law Wisconsin doctrine “requires the state to intervene to protect public rights in the
commercial or recreational use of navigable waters.”232 State v. Public Service Commission233 established several criteria by which courts could determine if the public trust obligations were being violated. These include
(1) commitment of a trust resource to non-public control; (2) access and
use; (3) destruction or significant impairment of protected uses; and (4) a
high ratio of “disappointment” of burdened parties to “convenience” for
those benefited.234 The Idaho Supreme Court in Kootenai gleaned from
this list a concern with project impacts, individual and cumulative, on
the public trust resource, in light of the resource’s “primary purpose,”
and concern with broad public uses being sacrificed to limited or private
ones.235
As for the scope of the public trust extending to wildlife, a Wisconsin statute provides that the state holds title to, and the custody and
protection of, all wild animals in the state, to regulate their enjoyment,
use, and conservation.236 Further, Wisconsin courts have considered it
“well established” that the state holds title to wild animals “for the benefit of the people.”237 They have never held, however, that wildlife is included within the formal scope of the public trust doctrine, which has
been limited to navigable waterways.238 Given this quasi-trust status,
Muench raises the question whether its expansion of protected uses depended on legislative enactment or might occur gradually with changing
values. The California courts, by comparison, had effected their public
trust revolution of sorts by asserting that in administering the public
trust, the state is not burdened with an “outmoded classification” favor-

230. Id. at 523.
231. See John Quick, The Public Trust Doctrine in Wisconsin, 1 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 105, 109–11
(1994).
232. Id. at 110.
233. 81 N.W.2d 71, 73–74 (Wis. 1957).
234. Id.
235. Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1985, 1092–93
(Idaho 1983).
236. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 29.011(1) (West 2004) (emphasis added).
237. State v. Lipinske, 249 N.W. 289, 291 (Wis. 1933).
238. Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 517 (Wis. 1952) (cited in Hilton ex
rel. Pages Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 717 N.W.2d 166, 173 (Wis. 2006)).
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ing traditional uses, but must yield to the “growing recognition” that one
of the most important public uses of trust resources is “preservation . . . in their natural state.”239 Wisconsin courts have used more pragmatic language, labeling Wisconsin’s Department of Natural Resources
(DNR) the “custodian of Wisconsin’s wildlife,” whose mandate is “to
maintain a balance between protection of wildlife and exploitation of the
state’s resources, and to conserve the wild plant and animal species” of
the state.240
This question of how the scope of the public trust might expand
assumes even greater importance in view of the statutory accretions
made to “public rights” in the context of dam permitting.241 In 1971, “ecological values” were added to “public interest” considerations, and the
enjoyment of environmental quality was declared to be a public right.242
Judicially, Just v. Marinette County243 proffered the oft-quoted dicta that
there is “no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential natural
character” of the land and “use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited
in its natural state.”244 The same court declared that the public trust doctrine obligates the state to “eradicate the present pollution and to prevent
further pollution” in its navigable waters.245
If the custodial relationship of the state to its wildlife can be analogized to its trust relationship to waterways, perhaps these expansions of
recognized uses, values, and duties will carry over as well. One court did
suggest a general affirmative public right to “preserve natural resources.”246 Moreover, only six months after Just, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court found that the public right to scenic beauty exists regardless of
whether this is codified in statute.247 The statute applicable to “structures” in navigable waters, rather than to dams, allowed permitting
when the structure is not “detrimental to the public interest.”248 The
court, ironically while remanding a DNR boathouse permit denial because the agency had applied its own recent administrative provision
rather than the statute in force, also urged it to consider a non-statutory
“natural beauty” criterion as part of its public interest determination.

239. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971).
240. Barnes v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 516 N.W.2d 730, 737 (Wis. 1994).
241. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 31.06 (West 2006).
242. 1971 Wis. Sess. Laws 1042.
243. 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
244. Id. at 768.
245. Id.
246. State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Wis. 1987) (citing Just, 201 N.W.2d 761
(Wis. 1972)).
247. Claflin v. Dep’t. of Natural Res., 206 N.W.2d 392 (Wis. 1973).
248. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 30.12(2)(a) (West 2002) (repealed 2003).
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“The natural beauty of our northern lakes is one of the most precious
heritages Wisconsin citizens enjoy. It is entirely proper that that natural
beauty should be protected as against specific structures that may be
found to mar that beauty.”249
Wisconsin courts have not been so eager to extend affirmative
protections to the state’s wildlife. In Barnes v. Department of Natural Resources,250 petitioners sought to require the DNR to commence a rulemaking procedure to add the bobcat to the state list of threatened species.
The court declined to hold, as a matter of law, that when presented with
inconclusive evidence of a species’ population stability, the DNR should
exercise the precaution of listing the species or at least engaging in
rulemaking.251 As already quoted, the DNR’s mandate is to “maintain a
balance,” and the statutory requirement for DNR to rely on scientific evidence to add to the endangered and threatened species list shows that
the legislature envisioned a husbanding of agency resources to commit
to species “proven to be in need of protection,” not merely in “unproven
decline.”252
As this suggests, the DNR has “wide regulatory authority over the
natural resources, fish and game of Wisconsin.”253 “The legislature has
delegated to the DNR broad authority to regulate under the public trust
doctrine and to administer [chapter] 30.”254 Indeed, most of the public
trust doctrine’s development since Muench has concerned statutes that
delegate the state’s public trust authority and obligations, partly to the
DNR, partly to local governments.255 Muench itself had stated that only
matters of local concern could be delegated to local governments, while
decisions threatening possible “interference with public rights,” such as
scenic beauty, must be made at the state level.256 Statutes delegating such
decisions to local institutions are unconstitutional.257 The DNR, by contrast, is authorized to make findings as to whether the interference with
public rights is outweighed by the public benefits of proceeding with a

249. Claflin, 206 N.W.2d at 398. See also Melissa Kwaterski Scanlan, The Evolution of the
Public Trust Doctrine and the Degradation of Trust Resources: Courts, Trustees and Political
Power in Wisconsin, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 135, 159–60 (2000).
250. 516 N.W.2d 730, 737 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
251. Id. at 739.
252. Id. (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 29.415(3) (West 1996) (current version at WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 29.604(3) (West 1997)).
253. LeClair v. Natural Res. Bd., 483 N.W.2d 278, 284 n.9 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
254. ABKA Ltd. P’ship v. Wis. Dep’t of Natural Res., 648 N.W.2d 854, 858–59 (Wis.
2002) (citing Wisconsin v. Town of Linn, 556 N.W.2d 394, 402 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996)).
255. Quick, supra note 231, at 110–11.
256. Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 524 (Wis. 1952).
257. Id. at 525.
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project.258 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals elaborated on these points in
Village of Menomonee Falls v. Department of Natural Resources.259 Delegations to local governments in furtherance of public trust interests are
valid so long as they are not construed as a “blanket delegation of the
state’s public trust authority” allowing localities to impair “paramount”
public trust interests.260 The state government, through the DNR, “retains
ultimate control over all issues essential to the protection of the public
trust.”261 The agency must balance three policy factors in enforcing its
public trust duties: preserving natural beauty, maximizing public use of
navigable waters, and providing for the convenience of riparian owners.262 Further, the public trust doctrine requires the DNR to determine a
resource’s “reasonable use” in light of each situation’s particular facts.263
The DNR’s project review process illustrates how firmly Wisconsin has remained within Muench’s framework of a public trust traditionally limited in scope, with a more expansive recognition of “public
rights” and solicitude for the “public interest.” To take one example, the
DNR denied an application for a permit to dredge part of a lake bed to
improve boat access.264 As this would occur below the ordinary highwater mark, the lake bed was subject to the public trust, and the DNR
conducted a thorough examination of numerous “public interest” factors,
including impacts on water quality, fishery values, the functional values
of wetlands, natural scenic beauty, and plant and wildlife diversity. The
administrative law judge concluded that, based on the overwhelming
amount of testimony as to detrimental impacts, the proposed project
would not be “consistent with the public interest” within the meaning of
section 30.20 of the Wisconsin Statute. The public trust duty “requires the
state not only to promote navigation but also to protect and preserve its
waters for fishing, hunting, recreation and scenic beauty.”265 Upon judicial review, DNR factual findings are evaluated under the “substantial
evidence” test, and its legal conclusions are granted “great weight”
deference.266
The basis for standing for private citizens and the state to challenge proposed or ongoing impairments of public trust resources has
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
1975).
266.

Id.
412 N.W.2d 505 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 514–15.
Quick, supra note 231, at 111.
Hilton v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 717 N.W.2d 166, 173 (Wis. 2006).
Id. at 174.
Harry K. Carr, Jr. Permit Application, 1998 WL 998156 (Oct. 16, 1998).
Wisconsin’s Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 271 N.W.2d 69, 72 (Wis.
Hilton, 717 N.W.2d at 172.
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been heavily litigated in Wisconsin. As already noted, Muench had held
that the public trust doctrine entitles the public to enforce its rights to
navigation, fishing, recreation, and the enjoyment of scenic beauty, even
in the absence of a direct economic interest, to the full extent a party
could enforce financial rights in Wisconsin courts.267 The state supreme
court limited this generalized standing somewhat in State v. Deetz.268 In
Deetz, the state argued that a cause of action against a land developer
causing runoff damaging a lakeshore arose simply out of interference
with the public’s right to use and enjoy navigable waters.269 The court
disagreed, concluding that the public trust doctrine does not create substantive legal rights, but merely “gives the state standing as trustee to
vindicate any rights that are infringed upon by existing law.”270 The court
proceeded to quote Sax himself: “The ‘public trust’ has no life of its own
and no intrinsic content. It is no more—and no less—than a name courts
give to their concerns about the insufficiencies of the democratic process.”271 The court further restricted standing based essentially on injuryin-fact requirements in Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade v. Public Service
Commission:272 Wisconsin’s statutes entitling aggrieved parties to judicial
review of administrative decisions essentially required a petitioner to
“show a direct effect on his legally protected interests.”273 This was interpreted to require a “two-step analysis,” first ascertaining whether an
agency decision “directly causes injury to the interest of the petitioner,”
then determining “whether the interest asserted is recognized by law.”274
It may be especially instructive to observe how the Wisconsin Supreme Court dealt with the petitioners’ suggestion that the Wisconsin
Environmental Protection Act (WEPA),275 in effect established a “new
public trust in the entire environment.”276 The court had already found
persuasive the federal courts’ expansive recognition of standing in environmental cases, particularly those arising out of NEPA.277 The court entertained the idea that WEPA’s preamble, modeled on NEPA’s, “rises to
the level of establishing a public trust comparable to the public trust in

267. Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 522 (Wis. 1952).
268. 224 N.W.2d 407 (Wis. 1974).
269. Id. at 411.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 413 (quoting Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law, supra note
4, at 521).
272. 230 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1975).
273. Id. at 248. (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 227.15, 227.16(1) (West 2001).
274. Id.
275. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 1.11 (West 2004).
276. Wisconsin’s Envtl. Decade, 230 N.W.2d at 251.
277. Id. at 248, 252.
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navigable waters such that any harm to the environment is presumed to
harm the interests of any citizen of the state,” but ultimately found this
“doubtful.”278 However, it did hold that WEPA, like NEPA, had expanded substantive environmental law’s “zone of interests” such that the
second part of the standing analysis would be satisfied where “it is alleged that the agency’s action will harm the environment in the area
where the person resides.”279 If the court wavered here, it could be because the various state-implemented “mini-NEPAs,” like NEPA itself,
often embody a “statutory split personality” between a “new public trust
in the entire environment” and narrow strictly procedural requirements.280 This potential for courts to find or decline to find a new public
trust in state environmental policy acts has been commented on in California281 and in Michigan.282 At any rate, it is not the formal, still waterbased public trust doctrine from Muench that supports Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade’s expansion of environmental standing; a recent unpublished opinion rejected the extension of the doctrine to “all citizen
interests in the public natural resources,” including forests and
wildlife.283
The Wisconsin public trust doctrine, then, has remained vital but
also fairly static in the half-century since Muench. Its scope has remained
in navigable waters, and its obligations have remained roughly within
the banks of Muench’s principles of delegation to the DNR and local governments. Wisconsin courts have declined to find within evolving societal values or the state’s Environmental Protection Act a reason to expand
the trust’s scope to include wildlife or natural resources in general. On
the other hand, protected trust purposes have expanded gradually since
Muench made the big step forward, such that the DNR in its permit
processes now considers wildlife diversity and habitat as constituents of
the “public interest.”

278. Id. at 252.
279. Id.
280. Brady, supra note 4, at 636–37.
281. Antonio Rossmann, Comment, The 25-Year Legacy of Friends of Mammoth, 21 ENVIRONS: ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 63, 66 (1998) (mandating a “new model of . . . decisionmaking
when the environment is at risk,” the California courts have “collaborated with the
lawmakers to effect their inchoate will”).
282. Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am., 737 N.W.2d 447,
469 (Mich. 2007) (Weaver, J., dissenting). By holding that the Michigan EPA does not even
confer standing on the public, the Michigan Supreme Court has “taken the power to protect
the state’s natural resources away from the people.” Id.
283. Friends of Richland County v. Richland County, 727 N.W.2d 374, 2006 WL
3782971, *4 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).
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E. Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts
As with Michigan, Massachusetts’ public trust doctrine has essentially remained cabined by statute and judicial interpretation, but within
its traditionally narrow confines in both scope and protected uses.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has stated concisely that under
the public trust doctrine, “the Commonwealth holds tidelands in trust
for the use of the public for, traditionally, fishing, fowling, and navigation.”284 In Boston Waterfront Development Corp. v. Commonwealth, the
court based its recognition of the trust on Crown grants divided since the
Magna Carta into two legal categories: a proprietary jus privatum, or
ownership interest, and a governmental jus publicum, or sovereign trust
interest.285 The jus privatum could be parceled out to individuals or corporations as private property, but the jus publicum had to remain in trust
for the state’s residents.286 Since the geographic scope of the public trust
was originally recognized to encompass only tidal shorelands, the court
noted that as far back as the mid-nineteenth century, real estate on the
seashore to which the public have “a common and acknowledged right”
should be subject to more restrictive regulations than interior real estate.287 Into the later twentieth century, this additional restriction was still
characterized as an “easement of the public for the public uses of navigation and commerce,” combined with a “right of the state . . . to enter
upon and possess the same for the preservation and advancement of the
public uses.”288 The Boston Waterfront court, noting that the public trust
concept is difficult to describe in the language of property law, ultimately settled on holding that the Boston Waterfront Development Corporation had title in fee simple, but following Illinois Central, the
legislature could only make a grant for a “public purpose,” so that the
corporation’s fee is “subject to the condition subsequent” that it be used
for the public purpose for which it was granted.289
The only major modification made to the Boston Waterfront formulation has been by the 1983 and 1990 amendments to the 1866 Public
Waterfront Act (PWA),290 which are said to have “codified” Massachusetts’ public trust doctrine, delegating authority to the Massachusetts De-

284. Moot v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 861 N.E.2d 410, 412 (Mass. 2007).
285. Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 358 (Mass. 1979).
286. Id. at 359.
287. Id. at 365 (citing Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 95 (1851)).
288. Id. (citing Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass’n., 173 N.E.2d 273 (Mass.
1961), and quoting People v. Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79 (Cal. 1913), and, interestingly, Marks v.
Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 381 (Cal. 1971)).
289. Id.
290. 1983 Mass. Acts ch. 589, § 22; 1990 Mass. Acts ch. 177, § 151.
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partment of Environmental Protection (DEP) to manage the tidelands so
as “to preserve and protect the rights” of the public by ensuring that they
“are utilized only for water-dependent uses or otherwise serve a proper
public purpose.”291 One category of “water-dependent uses” specified by
regulation is for “wildlife refuges, bird sanctuaries, nesting areas, or
other wildlife habitats.”292 To this extent at least, the public trust doctrine’s codification in the PWA incorporates wildlife habitat designation
as a protected, but not a mandated, use of tidelands. Alternatively, in
Moot v. Department of Environmental Protection, the court noted without
further explanation that the “proper public purpose” was not identical
with public trust obligations.293 The test for a “public purpose” is (1)
whether there is “a direct public benefit” that reaches “a significant part
of the public,” and (2) whether private advantages are “reasonably incidental” to carrying out this public benefit.294 In fact, the legislature retains the authority to alienate public trust lands and even to extinguish
public rights by allowing private parties to render tidelands unfit for
“fishing, fowling, and navigation,” so long as it does not grossly disregard the public interest in doing so.295 Further, when the state authorizes
a “non-water dependent” use, it must make a specific finding that the
use provides a greater benefit than detriment to public rights and include in its license the exact parameters and conditions upon which the
license is granted; noncompliance with these can result in revocation of
the license.296
Interestingly, DEP’s brochure on the PWA includes a much
broader (though obviously non-binding) statement of the public trust
doctrine, in which “the public interest in all tidelands is rooted.”297 There,
the two major principles underlying the doctrine are that (1) “the public
has fundamental rights and interest in natural resources such as the air,
the sea and the shore, [and (2)] “the state, as trustee of the public interest,
has a duty to preserve and enhance both these natural resources and the
public’s right to use them.”298 The DEP may aspire to this National Audubon-like vision of its trusteeship, but most of its actual decision-making

291. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 91, § 2 (West 2001). See Karl P. Baker & Dwight H.
Merriam, Indelible Public Interests in Property: The Public Trust and the Public Forum, 32 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 275, 283–85 (2005).
292. 310 MASS. CODE REGS. 9.12(2)(a)(15) (2007).
293. Moot v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 861 N.E.2d 410, 412 n.5 (Mass. 2007).
294. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1100–01 (Mass. 1981).
295. Id. at 1099.
296. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 91, § 18 (West 2001). Moot, 861 N.E.2d at 414 nn.8–9.
297. MASS. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., CHAPTER 91: THE MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC WATERFRONT ACT (2003), available at http://www.mass.gov/dep/water/resources/c91comp.pdf.
298. Id. at 4.
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adheres to a more prosaic statutory and regulatory framework. In fact,
the DEP has evolved its own restrictive threshold standing rules for challengers to “M.G.L. ch. 91” licenses,299 requiring that they demonstrate
“more than a vague or transient interest in the matter” and that their
concrete interest “assures that they will represent responsibly the interests of public trust beneficiaries and advocate diligently the public rights
and interests they assert.”300
As this suggests, the PWA’s regulations do not extend standing to
challenge the granting of a license or permit to the general public or even
to the neighbor of a proposed project, unless the challenger satisfies the
nuisance-like definition of “aggrieved person” as one who as a result of
the license or permit “may suffer an injury in fact, which is different either in kind or magnitude, from that suffered by the general public,” and
which is within the scope of interests protected by the statute.301 In Higgins v. Department of Environmental Protection,302 for example, landowners
abutting filled tidelands on which a hotel would be constructed under a
DEP license sought to challenge the project approval, claiming impacts
on their views and traffic. The Massachusetts Appeals Court concluded
that a lower court’s dismissal on standing grounds was appropriate,
since the plaintiffs’ uses and potentially violated interests were not sufficiently water-dependent, and therefore outside of the scope protected by
the PWA.
This formulation and implementation of the public trust doctrine—traditional in both its scope and uses—seems to offer little potential for extraordinary protection to wildlife. In a more expansive vein,
Sax discussed a line of Massachusetts cases developing a judicial doctrine protective of public trust lands in his seminal 1970 article.303 The
“first major step” in this direction was Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commission.304 In Gould, the legislature authorized a commission administering a public park to construct and operate an aerial tramway and other
facilities; the commission expanded this proposal into an elaborate ski
resort. When local residents challenged the new project, the Massachusetts Supreme Court invalidated the underlying lease, holding that public park land “is not to ‘be diverted to another inconsistent public use

299. Licenses issued pursuant to Massachusetts’s laws pertaining to waterways found
at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 91.
300. In re Pamet Harbor Yacht Club, Inc., File No. W97-8800, 1999 WL 74240 (Mass.
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. Jan. 29, 1999).
301. 310 MASS. CODE REGS. 9.02 (2007).
302. 835 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
303. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law, supra note 4, at 491–502.
304. 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966).
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without plain and explicit legislation to that end.’”305 In Sax’s interpretation, the court devised a legal rule imposing a presumption that “the
state does not ordinarily intend to divert trust properties in such a manner as to lessen public uses.”306 With a “simple but ingenious flick of the
judicial wrist,” the court shifted the burden to state agencies to obtain
“specific, overt approval of efforts to invade the public trust” and thus
“struck directly at low-visibility decision-making.”307 In fact, another
commentator has pointed out, such a “stringently applied” requirement
for “explicit legislation” to encroach on public parks—sometimes called
the “prior public use” doctrine—can be traced back almost a century and
is most probably entirely separate and distinct from the public trust doctrine.308 Later cases, such as Sacco v. Department of Public Works, continued
this “hard look” into agency authorization and decision-making, most
notably invalidating a public works department’s decision to fill a pond
in part because an authorization for making “improvements” could not
be intended to derogate “the protection of water resources, fish and
wildlife and recreational values” mandated by a recent highway construction planning statute.309 The Idaho Supreme Court in Kootenai, following Sax, used Gould as its reference point for the “Massachusetts
Approach” to the public trust doctrine, the essential element of which
was that public trust resources may only be alienated by express legislative mandates.310
This contrast of the PWA with the Gould line displays a curious
dichotomy between the formal and limited public trust doctrine on the
one hand, and a probing review of agency natural resource decisions on
the other, which was never formally labeled the “public trust doctrine”
(neither Gould nor Sacco even mentions the doctrine), but functionally
performs its role. Much of the latter function was supplanted by Massachusetts’ enactment of its own Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) in
1972, which requires all state agencies to review their activities’ “impact
on the natural environment” and use “all practicable means and measures to minimize damage.”311 The extensive definition of “damage” is
geographically oriented and does not specifically mention wildlife or

305. Id. at 121.
306. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law, supra note 4, at 494.
307. Id.
308. Baker & Merriam, supra note 291, at 285, 289–91 (citing Higginson v. Slattery, 99
N.E. 523 (Mass. 1912); Heather J. Wilson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts Land
Law, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 839, 865–66 (1984)).
309. Sacco v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 227 N.E.2d 478, 480 (Mass. 1967).
310. Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1091
(Idaho 1983).
311. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, §§ 61–62 (West 2001).

R
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wildlife habitat, but it is clear that the courts consider an assessment of
wildlife effects part of a sufficient “environmental impact report” for particular projects. In Sierra Club v. Department of Environmental Management,312 an important recent case on MEPA, the court pointed to
assessment of a project’s impacts on an area’s “ecology,” “vegetation,”
and “wildlife habitats” as determinative of whether “[e]nvironmental impacts were adequately considered.”313
Also in 1972, Massachusetts amended article XLIX to its constitution, granting the people the right to “the natural, scenic, historic, and
esthetic qualities of their environment” and declaring “the protection of
the people in their right to the conservation, development and utilization
of . . . natural resources” to be a “public purpose,” apparently seeking to
guarantee the state its eminent domain power for these activities. These
natural resources include “wild birds . . . wild mammals and game.”314
However, this article does not operate as an independent grant of standing to vindicate the “constitutional right to clean air and clean water”;
the state supreme court in Enos v. Secretary of Environmental Affairs summarily dismissed this possibility in “one sentence, and without any discussion.”315 Barring a change in the court since Enos, it is difficult to see
how this article could support standing for a challenge to state failure to
protect wildlife. Massachusetts does offer statutory protections to endangered and threatened species and species “of special concern” through its
own Endangered Species Act, which prohibits taking protected species
as well as altering their “significant habitat.”316
With MEPA operating prospectively to cover new projects and the
PWA having codified the traditional public trust, the more conceptual
public trust (or prior public use) doctrine Sax found in Gould and its
progeny now occupies a much more limited sphere, being used in attempts to reverse such public decisions as to use Boston Common for
private commercial music concerts, for example.317 The Massachusetts
courts have further limited this potential by enforcing strict standing requirements. In Pratt v. City of Boston, the court equated a suit to restrain
cities and towns from carrying out “wrongful acts” with an attempt at
312. 791 N.E.2d 325, 336 (Mass. 2003).
313. Id. at 336.
314. MASS. CONST. art. XCVII. See also Protectmassenvironment.org, Article 97 Lands,
http://protectmassenvironment.org/article_97_lands.htm (last visited June 10, 2009) (discussing 1973 Massachusetts Attorney General opinion).
315. 731 N.E.2d 525, 532 n.7 (Mass. 2000); Anil S. Karia, A Right to a Clean and Healthy
Environment: A Proposed Amendment to Oregon’s Constitution, 14 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 37,
69–70 (2006).
316. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131A, §§ 1–6 (West 2002).
317. Pratt v. City of Boston, 483 N.E.2d 812, 812 (Mass. 1985).
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“taxpayer standing,” and it said that there must be a statutory basis instead.318 A statute aimed at enforcing public trust uses provided only for
commencement of a suit by the attorney general or a group of 10 taxpayers.319 Even a statute authorizing a challenge to the erection of a building
on a public park conferred a “highly restricted scope” of standing,
namely only as to the issue whether a concert stage is a building at all.320
Statutory standing does exist, however, for any 10 Massachusetts
plaintiffs challenging any “damage to the environment” that “is occurring or is about to occur,” subject to a de minimis exception and with the
remedy consisting of the issuance of a temporary restraining order.321 Although section 7A, after its 1973 reorganization, no longer requires that
the complained-of action be in violation of a statute,322 it is still a defense
to a suit that the defendant is in compliance with “a judicially enforceable administrative pollution abatement schedule or implementation plan
the purpose of which is alleviation of damage to the environment.”323
Lack of compliance can be failure to follow MEPA’s review provisions.324
Overall, in contrast to states such as California and Michigan in
which public trust resources, however defined, comprise a separate and
substantial area of judicial and administrative focus, the doctrine in Massachusetts seems confined and stunted, with its scope and uses narrowed by statute to mainly water-dependent and commercial uses. Even
the Massachusetts Division of Fisheries and Wildlife’s (MDFW) 2005
Comprehensive Wildlife Conservation Strategy325 fails to mention the
public trust doctrine in even an aspirational sense as a driver of its policies and operations. Instead, the MDFW points only to the constitution
and general laws as establishing and articulating its responsibilities,326
and a search on its home page produces no relevant results on how the
public trust doctrine influences wildlife policy.327 Similarly, the public
trust element in takings analyses sometimes appears as an afterthought,
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Id. at 817.
Id. at 818 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 3(10) (West 2005)).
Id. at 819 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 45, § 7 (West 1994)).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 7A (West 2005).
See Boston v. Mass. Port Auth., 308 N.E.2d 488, 493–94 (Mass. 1974).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 7A (West 2005).
Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 791 N.E.2d 325, 327–28 & n.3 (2003).
See generally MASSACHUSETTS DIVISION OF FISHERIES AND WILDLIFE, COMPREHENSIVE
WILDLIFE CONSERVATION STRATEGY (2005).
326. Id. at 35.
327. See Massachusetts Division of Fisheries & Wildlife, http://www.mass.gov/
dfwele/dfw/habitat/habitat_home.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). In contrast, the California Department of Fish and Game’s declaration states that the doctrine is “not just another
legal article” but “the guiding principle that binds government to the people it serves.”
California Fish and Game Strategic Plan, supra note 120.
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as in Wilson v. Commonwealth,328 in which a landowner sued after the
DEP’s predecessor agency denied a permit for a sea wall, and the
owner’s house was subsequently undermined by a major storm. After
deciding the case primarily on administrative grounds, the court inserted
a single paragraph noting that this coastal area “might” have been impressed with the public trust, so that the owners would have had “only
qualified rights to their shoreland” and “no reasonable investmentbacked expectations under which to mount a taking challenge.”329 Even a
major wind turbine project in Horseshoe Shoal, off the Massachusetts
coast in Nantucket Sound, the construction of which threatens unknown
disturbances to birds and marine life, has been analyzed almost entirely
under federal statutes, with environmental lawyer Robert Kennedy, Jr.,
among the few complaining that the project would “privatize
a . . . public trust resource” for commercial and industrial purposes,
even if environmentally friendly ones.330
Given this cramped development of the public trust doctrine in
Massachusetts—even within the context of the nationwide trend toward
judicial expansion of environmental protections in the 1970s and 1980s—
as well as the longstanding assumption that the PWA has comprehensively codified the doctrine, it seems unlikely that Massachusetts courts
would extend its scope or protected uses to wildlife conservation in any
way comparable to some other states.
F. Public Trust Doctrine in Washington
The Washington Supreme Court first recognized the public trust
doctrine in 1901 as the basis of the public’s right to use navigable waterways and the state’s right to regulate them.331 It founded this recognition
in article 17, section 1, of the Washington Constitution, which vested in
the state “ownership to the beds and shores of all navigable waters.”332
Initially, the geographic scope of the public trust was limited to naturally
navigable waterways and the protected uses were limited to navigation
and fishing. Nearly 70 years later, Wilbour v. Gallagher333 recognized that
328. 583 N.E.2d 894 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
329. Id. at 901.
330. Amanda Griscom, Tilting at Windmills: Activists Are Split on a Proposed Wind Project
Off Cape Cod, GRIST, Dec. 19, 2002, http://www.3grist.org/news/powers/2002/12/19/
griscom-windmill/index.html. See also Jay Wickersham, Sacred Landscapes and Profane Structures: How Offshore Wind Power Challenges the Environmental Impact Review Process, 31 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 325, 328 n.20 (2004) (listing the myriad of review processes to which the
project is subject).
331. New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co., 64 P. 735 (Wash. 1901).
332. WASH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
333. 462 P.2d 232 (Wash. 1969).
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the “logical extension” of the scope of the doctrine includes occasionally
artificially submerged lands, and an expansion of protected uses that
would include “corollary” recreational uses such as boating and swimming.334 Prompted partially by the Wilbour court’s expressions of concern
at the absence of state or local involvement in designating what developments would be appropriate and in what locations, at the outset of the
“environmental decade” of the 1970s the Washington Legislature enacted
the Shoreline Management Act (SMA),335 which established a “regulatory
scheme and public involvement process for tideland and shoreline
development.”336
The classic exposition of Washington’s current public trust doctrine was given in Caminiti v. Boyle.337 It is founded on the distinction
between the jus privatum, or “private property interest,” which the state
holds in tidelands and shorelands, and the jus publicum, or “public authority interest,” which covers navigable waterways and lands under
them.338 While the state is free to convey the jus privatum “as absolutely
as if the transaction were between private individuals,” the sovereignty
and dominion over this state’s tidelands and shorelands, as distinguished from title, always remains in the state, and the state holds such
dominion in trust for the public.339 This “public authority interest” in
these lands remains as inalienable as the state’s police power.340 Drawing
on Illinois Central’s assertion that “[t]he control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used
in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of
without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands
and waters remaining,” the Caminiti court devised a test for whether an
exercise of legislative power over trust resources violates the public trust
doctrine. First, courts
must inquire as to: (1) whether the state, by the questioned
legislation, has given up its right of control over the jus publicum and (2) if so, whether by so doing the state (a) has promoted the interests of the public in the jus publicum, or (b) has
not substantially impaired it.341

334. Id. at 237, 239.
335. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.58.010–.930 (West 2009 & Supp. 1988).
336. F. Lorraine Bodi, The Public Trust Doctrine in the State of Washington: Does It Make
Any Difference to the Public?, 19 ENVTL. L. 645, 647 (1989).
337. 732 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1987).
338. Id. at 993–94.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 994–95.
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Before applying this test to the legislation at issue in Caminiti, the court
noted that all of these requirements are “fully met” by the SMA’s “legislatively drawn controls” on new development projects that are designed
to prevent adverse environmental effects.342 Indeed, Washington courts
consider the SMA to constitute the “codification” of the doctrine, at least
for tidal shorelands.343
The scope of Washington’s public trust doctrine has remained
limited to Caminiti’s tidelands and shorelands, with some judicial pressure for expansion, as will be noted, though the protected uses have been
expanded as far in California’s Marks v. Whitney and through U.S. Supreme Court decisions. In Rettkowski v. Department of Ecology,344 the
Washington Supreme Court refused to recognize any state public trust
obligations even over non-navigable waters or groundwater, and disclaimed any intention of revisiting the doctrine’s scope.345 One justice
dissented, maintaining that the history and the theory of the public trust
doctrine argued strongly for abandoning the navigability requirement as
“ultimately artificial and absurd.”346 Since the U.S. Supreme Court and
other state courts, such as California’s, have extended the protected uses
well beyond navigation, it is “odd” to suggest that the “sole measure of
the expanse of [trust] lands is the navigability of the waters over
them.”347 At its most basic level, “the scope of the public trust doctrine is
defined by the public’s needs in those natural resources necessary for
social stability, [thus requiring their] protection and perpetuation.”348
There have been other hints of expansion, but these have mainly
been limited to the recognition of new protected uses, often including
wildlife preservation measures. Shortly after Caminiti, in Orion Corp. v.
State,349 for example, the Washington Supreme Court suggestively described public trust doctrine as resembling “a covenant running with the
land (or lake or marsh or shore) for the benefit of the public and the land’s
dependent wildlife.”350 As in Rettkowski, the court quickly disclaimed any
342. Id. at 995.
343. See Ass’n of Wash. Bus. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, SHB No. 00-037, 2001 WL
1022097, *2 (Wash. Shorelines Hearings Bd. 2001). See also Portage Bay-Roanoke Park Cmty.
Council v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 593 P.2d 151, 153 (Wash. 1979) (“any common-law public benefit doctrine this state may have had prior to 1971, has been superseded and the
SMA is the present declaration of that doctrine.”).
344. 858 P.2d 232 (Wash. 1993).
345. Id. at 239 & n.5.
346. Id. at 244 (Guy, J., dissenting).
347. Id. (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988)).
348. Id. (citing Joseph Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles,
14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 189 (1980)).
349. 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987).
350. Id. at 1072–73 (emphasis added) (quoting Reed, supra note 159, at 118).
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intention of deciding the doctrine’s “total scope,” but Orion did note the
gradual expansion of protected uses to encompass “incidental rights of
fishing, boating, swimming, water skiing, and other related recreational
purposes,” and it cited with approval Virginia, Wisconsin, and California
decisions expanding the doctrine to wildlife, non-tidal lands, and ecological values generally.351 The Washington Supreme Court gave formal recognition to the first and last of these uses in Weden v. San Juan County.352
In Weden, the court addressed a challenge to a county ordinance banning
the operation of motorized personal watercraft, specifically to protect
threatened or endangered marine mammals and birds and their habitat
from harassment. One ground for the challenge was that the ordinance
violated the public trust doctrine’s guarantee of public access to waterways. Although the strict basis of the court’s rejection of this challenge
was its finding that the county had not given up control of its waters and
therefore complied with the Caminiti test, the court proceeded to scoff at
the suggestion that the public trust doctrine should be used “to sanction
an activity that actually harms and damages the waters and wildlife of
this state.”353 The court cited a law review article, rather than precedent,
for the assertion that the doctrine’s protected purposes include “public
ownership interests in . . . environmental quality.”354
In Weden and other cases, Washington courts have seemingly
taken for granted that protection for wildlife is a permissible, if not mandated, public trust purpose. This assumption likely derives from the legislature’s dual directives in the SMA to “protect[ ] against adverse effects
to the public health, the land and its vegetation and wildlife . . . while
protecting generally public rights of navigation and corollary rights incidental thereto.”355 As early as 1979’s Portage Bay decision, the SMA’s “underlying policy” favoring careful planning, management, and
coordination of shoreline development was recognized as reflecting
“trust principles,”356 and even earlier, its policy protecting “aesthetic” and
“spiritual” environmental values constituted a potentially justified exercise of the police power, after satisfying a balancing test of “property

351. Id. at 1073 & n.10 (citing In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va.1980);
Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal.
1971)).
352. 958 P.2d 273, 283–84 (Wash. 1998).
353. Id. at 284.
354. Id. at 283 (citing Ralph W. Johnson et al., The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone
Management in Washington State, 67 WASH. L. REV. 521, 524 (1992), available at http://www.
ecy.wa.gov/pubs/93054.pdf).
355. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58.020 (West 2004).
356. Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 n.11 (Wash. 1987) (citing Portage BayRoanoke Park Cmty. Council v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 593 P.2d 151(Wash. 1979)).
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rights” and “social needs,” so as not to require compensation for a taking.357 The Shoreline Hearings Board (SHB), invested by the SMA with
authority over permitting reviews under section 90.58.180, has viewed
the SMA’s primary mandate as maintaining “public use and enjoyment
of the shorelines,” which covers the right to navigation but includes
other forms of public access and even visual impacts.358 The SHB notes
that, after Weden, the public interest in access to and enjoyment of the
shoreline “necessarily includes a component of environmental and
habitat protection.”359 The statute requires local governments to develop
“master programs” for regulation of the uses of the shoreline consistent
with Washington Department of Ecology guidelines and including economic development, public access, recreation, transportation, and conservation elements.360
In the late 1990s, the Department of Ecology undertook a major
revision of its guidelines in an attempt to reverse declines in the quality
of the state’s shorelines due to rapid or ill-considered development.361
Two notable inclusions were provisions developed in cooperation with
federal agencies to avoid state liability for “take” under the federal ESA
and assure ESA compliance, specifically by initiating consultations with
the federal ESA agencies on individual master programs, and by establishing a new emphasis on “restoring ecological functions.”362 In other
words, in spirit if not expressly, the Department of Ecology was attempting to implement SMA directives as an affirmative, public trust-like obligation to preserve and restore the state’s fish and wildlife—a move
which would test the expansiveness of the state courts’ interpretation of
the SMA’s public trust basis. Unfortunately, the guidelines never made it
to court but were reviewed by the SHB itself, in Ass’n of Washington Businesses v. Washington Department of Ecology, which in a divided decision
struck down the state ESA provisions but left the restoration emphasis
intact.363 While the majority interpreted the Department of Ecology’s authority to require the SMA to effectuate the Department’s imposition of
357. Dep’t of Ecology v. Pacesetter Construction Co., 571 P.2d 196, 198–201 (Wash.
1977).
358. Ass’n of Wash. Bus. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, SHB No. 00-037, 2001 WL 1022097,
*9 (Wash. Shorelines Hearings Bd. 2001).
359. Id. (citing Weden v. San Juan County, 958 P.2d 273, 698).
360. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58.080(1), .100(2)(a)-(i) (West 2004).
361. See News Release, Ecology Department Adopts New Shoreline Guidelines, Nov.
29, 2000, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/news/2000news/2000-230.html (last visited June 10,
2009).
362. Ass’n of Wash. Bus. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, SHB No. 00-037, 2001 WL 1022097,
*4–9 (Wash. Shorelines Hearings Bd. 2001) (citing WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-26-200, -210
(2000)).
363. See generally id.
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master program elements (which are meant to protect and restore ecological functions),364 the partial dissenters argued that the new guidelines
“fail to account for the balancing of interests that is contained in the language and the history of the act and impermissibly shift the focus to
habitat restoration.”365 On the endangered species issue, the majority
found that the Department of Ecology had no statutory mandate to “implement the ESA,” while a lone dissenter argued that the Department
was in fact implementing the SMA “in a manner consistent with the ESA”
and “should be commended.”366 Given this extreme divergence within
the SHB itself, it is tempting to view Ass’n of Washington Businesses—
which included a score of interested parties on each side, roughly classifiable as developers and local governments against environmentalists—
as a lost opportunity for the courts, especially the state supreme court, to
rule on the scope and extent of the state’s public trust obligations toward
wildlife preservation and restoration.
After the Department of Ecology’s unsuccessful attempt to insinuate ESA principles into the SMA, a Washington Court of Appeals returned to the scope of the common law public trust doctrine as applied
to both shoreline and upland wildlife, in a pair of 2004 decisions. A 2000
decision, State v. Longshore,367 had held that the public trust doctrine confers no right of access to the general public to take naturally occurring or
cultivated clams from property that the state had sold into private ownership.368 In Washington State Geoduck Harvest Ass’n v. Washington State
Department of Natural Resources,369 a commercial clam harvesting group
argued that Longshore’s public-private distinction should mean that the
state has no authority to regulate access to wildlife on public shorelands,
an interpretation that would render the Washington Department of Natural Resources’ (DNR) auctioning of harvesting rights invalid. Since the
shellfish at issue were “embedded” in the public shorelands, the court
did not need to expand the doctrine’s traditional scope, though it—perhaps inadvertently—used affirmative language in describing the public
trust as “obligat[ing] the state to balance the protection of the public’s
right to use resources on public land with the protection of the resources
that enable these activities.”370 The court retreated from this dicta in its
holding, which merely found DNR’s state regulation of shellfish harvesting “consistent with our state’s protection of commerce, navigation, com364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
Id. at 21.
Id. at 5, 26–27 (emphasis in original).
5 P.3d 1256 (Wash. 2000).
Id. at 1260.
101 P.3d 891 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
Id. at 895–96.
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mercial fishing, and incidental recreational activities” and agreed with
Caminiti’s test for permissible state action under the public trust
doctrine.371
At issue in Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Management v. State372
were two state initiatives that imposed restrictions on game hunting
methods as well as questions regarding the public trust doctrine’s scope
and the extent and character of the state’s obligations. A hunting group
argued that the initiatives violated the state’s public trust duty to control
and manage wildlife for the public’s benefit. The court noted initially
that the state does hold title to wild animals “in trust for the peoples’ use
and benefit.”373 It cited an old case asserting that the “killing, taking and
use of game was subject to absolute governmental control for the common good.”374 However, citing Caminiti, Rettkowski, and Weden, the court
asserted that “[n]o Washington court ha[d] ever applied the public trust
doctrine to terrestrial wildlife or [even terrestrial] resources.”375 The court
proceeded to assume, without deciding, that the public trust doctrine
would apply to the initiatives, and it applied the test from Caminiti,
“ask[ing] (1) whether the state has given up its right of control over the
jus publicum; (2) if so, whether the state (a) has promoted the public’s
interest in the jus publicum, or (b) has not substantially impaired it.”376
The court answered the threshold question negatively; the state did not
cede control over natural resources through the initiatives, but rather
seemed to assume greater control.377 Interestingly, a concurring judge
wrote separately to expressly assert that the public trust doctrine should
apply to all the state’s resources and that because the “primary beneficiaries” of the trust are “those who have not yet been born,” the more
important inquiry is not whether the “state”—the voters or the government at any given time—have retained control over the resources in
question, but whether they are fulfilling their obligation “to manage natural resources well for the benefit of future generations.”378 Within this
one appellate court at least, there has been a significant divergence between a formalistic and procedural conception of the public trust and a
more substantive and result-oriented one that would obviously afford
stronger protection to wildlife along with other state resources.

371. Id. at 896–97.
372. 103 P.3d 203 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
373. Id. at 205.
374. Id. (citing Cawsey v. Brickey, 144 P. 938, 939 (Wash. 1914)).
375. Id. (emphasis added).
376. Id. at 206.
377. Id. at 207–08.
378. Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 103 P.3d 203, 208–09 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2004) (Quinn-Brintnall, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
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Another basis of state authority for affirmative oversight of natural resources is the Washington State Environmental Policy Act of 1971
(SEPA).379 Modeled on NEPA, SEPA directs that state and municipal entities prepare environmental impact statements (EIS) for proposed “major actions significantly affecting the quality of the environment” to
insure that “presently unquantified environmental amenities and values
will be given appropriate consideration in decision-making.”380 As with
NEPA, SEPA’s legislative declarations include strong public trust language, asserting that it is the “continuing responsibility” of the state to
use “all practicable means” to work toward fulfilling “the responsibilities
of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations.”381 In the decades since SEPA’s adoption, the primary development seen to negatively impact environmental conditions has been the
rapid and often uncontrolled growth of Washington’s urban and suburban areas.
As with NEPA, SEPA’s requirements have been given a largely
procedural as opposed to a substantive spin by the Washington courts.
Nevertheless, in Adams v. Thurston County,382 for example, a court of appeals affirmed that “SEPA overlays and supplements all other state
laws.”383 While a locality cannot seek to grab unfettered control over local
growth by interposing EIS requirements into the plat application process
for subdivisions, (so as to delay vesting of property rights in conflict
with the state vesting statute),384 neither can a locality treat SEPA as a
mere formality but must “gather complete environmental information”
before development can proceed.385 Even if a proposed development is
allowed under zoning and building ordinances frozen at the time of vesting, a locality retains the discretionary ability to condition or deny any
development based on environmental impacts identified in its EIS.386
Thus, besides the interagency conflicts suggested in the Ass’n of
Washington Businesses hearing discussed above, SEPA, SMA, and their
public trust implications have engendered numerous battles between
state and local governments that are determined to impose stricter environmental conditions on new development. In a recent case, Biggers v.
City of Bainbridge Island,387 an island city in Puget Sound imposed a mora379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.010-.914 (West 1998).
Id. § 43.21C.030.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.020 (West 1998).
855 P.2d 284 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 287.
Id. at 290.
Id. at 291.
Id.
169 P.3d 14 (Wash. 2007).
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torium on shoreline development so it could address the possible impacts on threatened salmon habitat. When developers challenged the
moratorium as ultra vires, the city attempted to assert a novel theory of
local police power over “development of private property on shorelines
of statewide significance.”388 Ironically, perhaps, the Washington Supreme Court relied on the public trust doctrine in rejecting the city’s attempt to offer greater protections to wildlife habitat. Because the State of
Washington cannot convey or give away its jus publicum interest in
shorelines to private parties, it “[c]learly” cannot “impliedly abdicate[ ]”
the interests of all Washington residents to local governments.389 The
state has validly and expressly delegated “some state power” over shorelines under the SMA; since the SMA “embodies a legislatively-determined and voter-approved balance between protection of state
shorelines and development,” local governments are not authorized to
conflict with it.390 A lone dissent suggested that the majority had misapplied Washington’s public trust doctrine precedent: Rettkowski and
Caminiti held that the state could delegate its public trust duty, and the
majority here even noted that it had done so under the SMA.391 Since the
SMA “explicitly grants local government exclusive authority to administer the permit program,”392 the city had the authority to defer acceptance
of permit applications.393
The larger battle, strikingly reflected in Washington’s divided decisions and elsewhere, has been how the public trust doctrine’s affirmative duties, perceived as potentially unmanageable administratively and
judicially, could be kept carefully confined within express legislative enactments or an unexpressed legislative “power.” Indeed, the formalism
of recent decisions that expand on Rettkowski’s majority opinion seems to
have moved even farther away from Justice Guy’s dissenting view that
“the scope of the public trust doctrine is defined by the public’s needs in
those natural resources necessary for social stability.”394 Just as the SHB
in Ass’n of Washington Businesses disallowed the Department of Ecology’s
initiatives to protect endangered species, the state supreme court in R.D.
Merrill Co. v. State Pollution Control Hearings Board,395 concluded that “the
public trust doctrine does not serve as an independent source of author-

388. Id. at 21.
389. Id. at 21–22 (citing Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232 (Wash. 1993);
Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1987)).
390. Id. at 22.
391. Id. at 30–31 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting).
392. Id. at 31 (emphasis in original).
393. Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 169 P.3d 14, 31 (Wash. 2007).
394. Rettkowski, 858 P.2d at 242.
395. 969 P.2d 458 (Wash. 1999).
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ity for the Department to use in its decision-making apart from the provisions in the water codes,” or even as an independent canon of
construction in interpreting the code provisions.396 This conclusion
flowed from Rettkowski’s important observation that “the duty imposed
by the public trust doctrine devolves upon the State, not any particular
agency thereof.”397 The Department of Ecology had no statutory authority to assume this duty to regulate to preserve the state’s “precious and
limited” resources.398 Even assuming it had such an affirmative duty, the
public trust doctrine “could provide no guidance as to how [the Department of] Ecology” would exercise it, since state agencies can look only to
statutory mandates for guidance.399 The recent decision in Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Management rejecting the public trust doctrine’s application to wildlife brought this reasoning full-circle, relying on R.D. Merrill,
along with Rettkowski, Weden, and Caminiti, to prevent the kind of functional expansion in the doctrine’s scope that Justice Guy seemed to think
was compelled by its underlying values.
While Washington’s courts have clearly accepted the legislature’s
application of the state’s public trust authority to the purpose of wildlife
protection, recent decades have been characterized by recurring battles
among Washington agencies and the judiciary itself as to how independent, how broadly spread, and how affirmative that authority should be.
Stated in terms of this article’s prefatory comments, Washington seems
to have accepted Marks v. Whitney’s recognition of the public trust doctrine’s dynamic and flexible uses but has stopped short of endorsing National Audubon’s affirmative obligations, despite notable pressure from
the Department of Ecology and some members of the bench to step
across this all-important line.
III. CONCLUSION
Obviously, the path to judicial recognition of the public trust in
wildlife has not been smooth. Indeed, this path has been so crisscrossed
and rutted with competing doctrines of constitutional limitations, property rights, and statutory and agency mandates that drawing generalizations across state lines invites oversimplification. Yet there are a few
observations about the various states’ responses to attempts to expand
the scope and protected uses of the public trust that can be meaningfully
hazarded.

396.
397.
398.
399.

Id. at 467.
Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 239 (Wash. 1993).
Id.
Id. at 239–40 (emphasis in original).
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First, the public trust doctrine courts powerful enemies. Because it
is both a recognition of a sort of latent public property interest in natural
resources and a form of constitutional limitation on state authority, in its
more affirmative formulations it has been aggressively opposed both by
proponents of strong private property rights and by proponents of broad
state agency discretion. The California Headwaters case discussed in
Part I400 illustrates perfectly how public trust advocates often have to battle both opponents at the same time. Time and again in the above discussions, environmentalists appear as unwelcome guests at the table. In
California’s FPL case,401 Michigan’s Nestle Waters,402 Wisconsin’s Barnes403
and Deetz,404 and Washington’s Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Management,405 the recurring response from the courts has been, “Please go
away, you are interrupting something important.” The great exception to
this cold reception was the groundbreaking National Audubon case,
which was also exceptional in that it featured a perfect villain—that
great water thief, the City of Los Angeles—an “imperiled” heroine, and a
“scenic and ecological treasure of national significance,”406 all of which
was turned into a cause celebre by a well-coordinated media campaign
and California’s most ubiquitous bumper-sticker.407
Second, compounding this first problem, the public trust doctrine
is susceptible to judicial sidestepping in two forms. One form, what
might be called the “deaf ear” approach, arises because in its post-Marks
v. Whitney formulation the public trust doctrine strikes a discordant note

400. Cal. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. (EPIC) v. Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 37 Cal. Rptr.
3d 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). See supra notes 28–32, 93–100, and accompanying text.
401. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., No. RG04-183113, 2006 WL
2987634 (Cal. Super. Ct. dismissed Oct. 12, 2006).
402. See generally Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am.,
Inc., 737 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 2007).
403. See Barnes v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 516 N.W.2d 730 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). ABKA
Ltd. P’ship v. Wis. Dep’t of Natural Res., 648 N.W.2d 854, 858–59 (Wis. 2002); Quick, supra
note 231, at 110–11.
404. See State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407 (Wis. 1974); Wisconsin’s Envtl. Decade v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n, 230 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1975).
405. See Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 103 P.3d 203 (Wash. Ct. App.
2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.010-.914 (West 1998).
406. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d. 709, 712 (Cal. 1983).
407. CRAIG ANTHONY ARNOLD, BEYOND LITIGATION: CASE STUDIES IN WATER RIGHTS DISPUTES 177, 189 (2002) (noting that the “Save Mono Lake” campaign generated thousands of
bumper stickers and had a substantial impact on Southern Californians’ attitudes about
their water, that the Mono Lake Committee gained more than 20,000 members, and that
public education and advocacy were crucial to the application of public trust principles to
this case). See also KAREN PIPER, LEFT IN THE DUST: HOW RACE AND POLITICS CREATED A
HUMAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL TRAGEDY IN L.A. 149 (2006) (describing the high-profile
campaign).
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of insurgency within courts inclined to enforce only the mostly procedural rights and duties well-defined by the “modern” statutory environmental law framework. Amidst this framework of state and federal
environmental policy acts and endangered species acts, advocates for the
doctrine’s expansion are essentially seeking to revive ancient common
law rights on behalf of specific ecological entities. While courts assuredly
continue to follow the interpretive principle that “statutes should not be
construed to abolish common law rights unless absolutely necessary,”408
they generally resort to glances at the common law to “fill gaps” in regulatory concepts or definitions,409 to address special harms suffered by
particular individuals or communities,410 or to allow recovery of damages.411 Courts consistently resist what amounts to granting standing to
rivers and ecosystems.412 California’s FPL case,413 in which the court essentially “nonsuited” wildlife advocates for undisputed massive raptor
deaths, offers the most straightforward example, but in Michigan’s Nestle
408. Courtney Enterprises, Inc. v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 788 So. 2d 1045, 1049 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001), cited in KENNETH A. MANASTER & DANIEL P. SELMI, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2:2 (2007). Cf. Cal. Ass’n of Health Facilities v. Dep’t of Health Services, 940 P.2d
323, 331 (Cal. 1997) (“unless expressly provided, statutes should not be interpreted to alter
the common law, and should be construed to avoid conflict with common law rules.”).
409. MANASTER & SELMI, supra note 408, at § 2:2 (citing City of Modesto Redevelopment
Agency v. Super. Ct., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 865, 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Leslie Salt Co. v. San
Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 200 Cal. Rptr. 575 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)).
410. Id. (citing Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass’n v. L.A., 603 P.2d 1329 (Cal.
1979) (nuisance action for airport noise)).
411. Id. (citing Wagner v. Anzon, 684 A.2d 570 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)).
412. The great counter-example, of course, is Justice Douglas’s dissent in Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741–52 (1972). Far from one of unleashing courts’ jurisdictional reach,
the problem of expanding standing is:
to make certain that the inanimate objects, which are the very core of
America’s beauty, have spokesmen before they are destroyed. It is, of
course, true that most of them are under the control of a federal or state
agency. The standards given those agencies are usually expressed in terms
of the “public interest.” Yet “public interest” has so many differing shades
of meaning as to be quite meaningless on the environmental front.
Id. at 745. In a separate dissent, Justice Blackmun questioned whether the law must “be so
rigid and our procedural concepts so inflexible that we render ourselves helpless when the
existing methods and the traditional concepts do not quite fit and do not prove to be entirely adequate for new issues.” Id. at 755–56. Both Justices felt so strongly about their dissents that they read them from the bench. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 982 (5th ed. 2006). The California Supreme Court
cited Justice Blackmun’s dissent in the landmark CEQA case Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of
Supervisors of Mono County, 502 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Cal. 1972), but otherwise this attitude of
special solicitude for the environment despite procedural and administrative law strictures
has not been widely adopted.
413. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., No. RG04-183113, 2006 WL
2987634 (Cal. Super. Ct. dismissed Oct. 12, 2006).
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Waters,414 Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade,415 and Washington’s Citizens
for Responsible Wildlife Management,416 courts have treated plaintiffs’
claims as “generalized grievances” better suited for solutions through the
political branches.
A cagier form of evasion, the “bait and switch” approach, occurs
when courts nominally recognize public trust rights and duties but
choose to define them conceptually417 rather than with geographic or, for
want of a better word, “ethical” precision, with Marks v. Whitney’s “preservation of lands in their natural state” epitomizing the latter. By doing
so, these courts have knowingly reserved to themselves the ability to defer these conceptual rights and duties to administrative analogs that are
grounded in more predictable and containable statutory mandates. The
Michigan, Massachusetts, and Washington courts, as has been seen, have
repeatedly found in each respective state’s EPA, PWA, and SMA, sufficient implementation of a common law duty to prevent the impairment
of certain natural resources so as to allow the former to essentially preempt the latter.418 Again, California serves as the exception that proves
the rule. The National Audubon court was urged to find in the state’s
water rights allocation system a sufficient accommodation of ecological
values to absorb these, but it pointedly refused to avert the “collision
course” on which they were bound, instead attempting to “integrate”
414. See generally Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc.,
737 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 2007).
415. See Wisconsin’s Envtl. Decade v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 230 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1975);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 1.11 (West 2004).
416. See Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 103 P.3d 203 (Wash. Ct. App.
2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.010-.914 (West 1998).
417. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 164 S.E. 689, 696 (Va. 1932). As
a commentator has noted, the Court was less than clear on how to distinguish the jus publicum—to which the public trust applies—from the jus privatum, but it apparently defined
the scope and uses of the public trust conceptually rather than geographically, requiring a
jus publicum right to be a commonly-enjoyed, public use that does not reduce a resource to
private property and that is substantially related to the preservation of some constitutional
right. See Sharon M. Kelly, The Public Trust and the Constitution: Routes to Judicial Overview of
Resource Management Decisions in Virginia, 75 VA. L. REV. 895, 908–12 (1989). This commentator has suggested that non-consumptive outdoor recreation, including the observation of
wildlife, should qualify in theory as a protected use. It is non-possessory, and it bears a
substantial relationship to the Virginia Constitution’s rights of “pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety.” VA. CONST. art. I, § 1. As already noted, however, Virginia courts
have used this strategic vagueness to defer “almost unconditionally” to private property
rights. See In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980); Commonwealth v.
City of Newport News, 164 S.E. 689 (Va. 1932); VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1; Robb v. Shockoe Slip
Found., 324 S.E.2d 674, 676–77 (Va. 1985); Butler, supra note 42.
418. See, e.g., City of Portage v. Kalamazoo County Road Comm’n, 355 N.W.2d 913, 915
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (courts are “not empowered to enjoin any conduct which does not
rise to the level of an environmental risk proscribed by the MEPA.”).
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their “teachings and values.”419 This refusal to collapse two factually related but ethically distinct inquiries into a discrete statutory procedure
has characterized and troubled California courts ever since.420 Courts are
naturally resistant to adopting formless criteria of review, and most state
courts, based on this sample, have opted for statutory certainty and uniformity when faced with a similar dilemma.
Third, in a more historical vein, it may have struck the reader that
in nearly all cases the recognition of ecological preservation as the basis
for a cause of action, via court decision or statutory enactment or both,
occurred roughly between 1970 and 1989, while in most of the above
cases, the erosion of this recognition began toward the tail end of this
two-decade span and has progressed methodically ever since. Idaho provides the most clear-cut example: despite the Idaho Supreme Court
seeming to find a constitutional public trust limitation on state authority
in Kootenai in 1983, the legislature felt free to cabin this limitation statutorily in 1996.421 Even in California, given that state’s tremendous population and resource pressures, Marks v. Whitney and National Audubon have
less spawned a revolution toward environmental restoration than erected a much-needed obstacle to the retreat witnessed in other states.422 It

419. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983).
420. See, e.g., El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d
468, 490–92 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (“Another important principle that may compete with the
rule of priority is the public trust doctrine. . . . [W]hen the public trust doctrine clashes
with the rule of priority, the rule of priority must yield. Again, however, every effort must
be made to preserve water right priorities to the extent those priorities do not lead to violation of the public trust doctrine.”). Early CEQA cases actually primed the California courts
for this sort of dramatic tension between values. A wonderful short article, Rossmann,
supra note 281, beautifully describes the momentousness of the Friends of Mammoth and
especially the Owens River decisions of the 1970s, which “read less like legal doctrine and
more like passages of great scripture,” succeeding, in cases that “could have gone the other
way . . . within the limits of human inadequacy to capture in words mandate and aspirations that transcend the moment.” Id. at 69.
421. See Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1203 (2002); supra notes 145–72 and accompanying text.
422. See David R.E. Aladjem, Innovation Within a Regulatory Framework: The Protection of
Instream Beneficial Uses of Water in California, 1978 to 2004, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 305, 326
(2005) (observing that two SWRCB proceedings in 1994 and 2001 may “have marked the
high-water mark of the public trust doctrine”). See also Gregory A. Thomas, Conserving
Aquatic Biodiversity: A Critical Comparison of Legal Tools for Augmenting Streamflows in California, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 40 (1996): “[California’s public trust doctrine] fails to prescribe
the circumstances under which water must be allocated for environmental protection.”
Also, “barring further legal developments, the utility of the public trust doctrine for restoring impaired aquatic ecosystems can be undermined by the discretion inherent in its application.” See, e.g., State Water Res. Control Bd. Cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 272–73 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006) (“While the Board had a duty to adopt objectives to protect fish and wildlife
uses and a program of implementation for achieving those objectives, in doing so the Board

R

R

\\server05\productn\n\nmn\49-1\NMN107.txt

Winter 2009]

unknown

Seq: 61

THE PUBLIC TRUST IN WILDLIFE

9-MAR-10

15:29

309

seems no coincidence that the 1990s also saw aggressive efforts to repeal
major components of the federal environmental statutes, with a Congress
and judiciary “decidedly more skeptical” about the entire regulatory
framework.423 California, to a degree unmatched by other states, continued to grapple with exponential growth and the resulting water
shortages and loss of habitat and open space.424 Probably because these
problems maintained high public visibility and spawned widespread

also had a duty to consider and protect all of the other beneficial uses to be made of water
in the Bay-Delta, including municipal, industrial, and agricultural uses. It was for the Board
in its discretion and judgment to balance all of these competing interests in adopting water
quality objectives and formulating a program of implementation to achieve those objectives. . . . The public trust doctrine entitles [plaintiffs] to nothing more.”). See also Cachuma
Phase II, supra note 32, at 773–74 where attorney Karen Kraus for California Trout asserts
that, “The Supreme Court of California has made it clear that this perspective [giving consumptive uses of water a higher priority than public trust uses] no longer has a place here,”
and recites the “Mono Lake Case” criteria as the “legal framework” for the contention that
the state’s river management actions are not adequate to achieve the restoration of steelhead
habitat.
Current proceedings in the massive Bay-Delta controversy are likely to define to
some extent the future restoration mandate of the public trust doctrine in California. See
Gary A. Patton, As Delta Crumbles, California Water Board May Review Whether Exports Are
Consistent with Public Trust, CAL. PROGRESS REPORT, Dec. 1, 2007, http://www.california
progressreport.com/2007/12/as_delta_crumbl.html (last visited June 10, 2009). See also
SWRCB’s Dec. 4, 2007 proceedings index (including the Public Trust Alliance’s comments),
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/bay_delta/120407
_board_meeting/ (last visited June 10, 2009).
423. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 412, at 88, 96–97 (calling this a period of “Regulatory
Recoil and Reinvention”).
424. See BANK OF AM. ET AL., BEYOND SPRAWL: NEW PATTERNS OF GROWTH TO FIT THE
NEW CALIFORNIA 3, 8 (1996), available at http://gifi.stat.ucla.edu/background/Smart
Growth/Sprawl/36_beyond_sprawl.pdf (correlating California’s population doubling to
32 million since the mid-1960s—effectively adding “another Oakland or Fresno every
year”—with massive encroachment on natural ecosystems, including the destruction of 95
percent of the state’s wetlands, and a projected water deficit of 2 to 8 million acre-feet by
2020). See also DAVID CARLE, INTRODUCTION TO WATER IN CALIFORNIA 135 (2004) (holding
water development and “changes in the waterscape” responsible for California’s “distinction as one of the globe’s extinction epicenters of the twentieth century”); DAVID CARLE,
WATER AND THE CALIFORNIA DREAM: CHOICES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 144, 147 (2000)
(documenting California’s loss of 99 percent of native grasslands, 89 percent of riparian
woodlands, 95 percent of wetlands, 280 listed endangered or threatened plant and animal
species, the disappearance of 57 million out of 60 million former migratory birds, and 94
percent of the 1950s coho salmon run or 99.4 percent of the estimated 1850s run); Jane Kay,
Chinook Salmon Run Shrinks—Fishing Industry Alarmed, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 30, 2008 (Central Valley fall Chinook salmon run—the “workhorse” for the California and Oregon fishing industry—“apparently has collapsed”). See generally MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT:
THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER (1993); NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT
THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER: A HISTORY (2001) (providing essential background on
California and the West’s allocation and misallocation of water resources).
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support for anti-development measures,425 the courts there remained
sensitive to enforcing environmental restraints.426 In Washington, confronting the same situation on a smaller scale, it is notable that state supreme court decisions there that have tended toward retrenchment
generated adamant dissents,427 and that much of the litigation has been
between state government waiving potential public trust responsibilities
and local governments seeking to enforce them on their own.428
As one front in the effort toward a “new ethical framework” for
environmental decision-making, then, an expanded public trust in wildlife has recently suffered as many defeats as it has enjoyed victories.
Nearly four decades ago, Joseph Sax introduced the idea that environmental advocates could use the public trust doctrine in cases where the
“whole of the public interest has not been adequately considered” by
legislatures and agencies, and court intervention would produce the
“openness and visibility” to protect the public against special interest
“overreaching” and provide the best “climate for democratic policy making.”429 After a decade or so of encouraging advance, through the enactment of trust-like statutes and judicial solicitude for ecological values,
Sax’s vision has been increasingly stymied by excessive deference to
agency capitulation to resource pressures, private property rights activism, and in some cases, outright judicial hostility, contortions, and distortions. It simply cannot be right, for example, that a Michigan law
intended by Sax to provide every resident a legally enforceable right to
environmental quality, and endorsed by that the state’s courts as such,
suddenly constitutes an impermissible judicial power-grab.430 Similarly,
it cannot be right that courts recognizing a public “ownership interest” in
environmental quality should continue to define its scope by an archaic
“navigability” principle rather than by “the public’s needs in those natural resources necessary for social stability,”431 or deny local governments

425. See, e.g., Shawn Doherty, Anti-Growth Forces Heed Battle Cry Development,
L.A.TIMES, May 23, 1991, at J1 (describing “droves” of activists warning of “impending development doom”). Kevin Roderick, The Times Poll: Rationing, Slow Growth Favored to Offset
Drought, L.A.TIMES, Jan. 31, 1991, at A1.
426. See, e.g., Fed’n of Hillside and Canyon Ass’n v. L.A., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000) (striking down part of City’s General Plan Framework for insufficient factual
support for its growth mitigation measures).
427. See, e.g., Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 244 (Wash. 1993) (Guy, J.,
dissenting).
428. Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island, 169 P.3d 14 (Wash. 2007).
429. Sax, supra note 4, at 495–96.
430. See Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc., 737
N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 2007).
431. Rettkowski, 858 P.2d at 239 & n.5.
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the authority to protect local resources.432 One circumstance potentially
presaging a reversal of this recent trend toward retrenchment is the
growing sense of urgency attending the accelerating loss of biodiversity433 and the growing recognition that complacency and intransigence in
the face of humanity’s virtual destruction of our environment are no
longer acceptable responses.434 Perhaps, in Sax’s “New Age of Environmental Restoration,” a revitalized concern with undoing our calamitous
impacts on wildlife, wildlife habitat, and biodiversity will be enough to
reverse the trend traced here.

432. Biggers, 169 P.3d at 14.
433. The recognition of climate change as the “defining challenge of our age” has
brought the issue of attendant biodiversity loss front and center. E.g., Jeffrey Kluger, Global
Warming Heats Up, TIME, Apr. 3, 2006 (the famous “stranded polar bear” cover story, noting
“crashing” habitats across North America and upwards of 85 percent of poll respondents
favoring government action). See generally THOMAS E. LOVEJOY & LEE HANNAH, CLIMATE
CHANGE AND BIODIVERSITY (2004).
434. See, e.g., BILL MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE 171–78 (1990). (For the heretofore
“spectacularly foreign” idea that “the rest of creation might count for as much as we
do . . . has very slowly begun to spread in recent years, both in America and abroad, as
the effects of man’s domination have become clearer”); REISNER, supra note 424, at 512–14
(describing an “epochal shift in values” that has worked as the engine of change—with law,
such as the public trust doctrine, serving as the “ignition”—toward something that is now
“beginning to seem plausible”: “undoing the wrongs caused by earlier generations” and
committing to put an essential resource such as water back where “it really belongs”).
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